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Walk into any retailer in the country and you will see the same thing; multi-
ple versions of the same product, possibly produced by different manufacturers or
with slightly different attributes, for sale at different prices. Economists refer to this
phenomenon as price discrimination and have theoretically established that price
discrimination generally harms consumers, raises profits and typically leads manu-
facturers and retailers to offer too much variety. Empirical studies have verified these
results, but have also uncovered additional puzzles, such as why different retailers
offer different versions of a product, or how competition distorts the price schedule
of a versioned product.
This thesis explores the relationship between these two puzzles. In chapter II, I
examine whether a monopolist offering different container sizes of a single product
alters that product’s price schedule when a new product is introduced. If a monopo-
list is willing to alter it’s price schedule, then a common explanation for both puzzles
exists; differing consumer tastes causes some firms to introduce new versions of a
product while also distorting the price schedule of their existing product.
To assess the validity of this hypothesis, I modify a model of second-degree price
discrimination so that consumers tastes for a product differ across two dimensions; a
1
vertical dimension representing a consumer’s taste for convenience and a horizontal
dimension representing a consumer’s taste for a particular product. This model yields
a surprising result; if consumer tastes are separable over these two dimensions, then
the introduction of a new product does not distort the price schedule of an existing
product. In other words, the model suggests that the only way that a new product
introduction could explain both puzzles is for consumers who prefer convenience to
also prefer a particular product
Using detailed, store-level data from the Dominick’s Fine Foods supermarket
chain, I test the model’s prediction by investigating whether stores within this chain
distort the prices of different sizes of a sport drink when they introduce a new sports
drink. Sports drinks are an ideal choice for studying this trade-off; unlike other prod-
ucts sold in Dominick’s stores, sports drinks are almost completely characterized by
their size, manufacturer, and flavor, all of which are observed in the data. Moreover,
since the number of sports drinks sold by Dominick’s stores increases over the course
of the sample, the data contain a number of opportunities to examine the effect of
product entry and exit.
I find that a product release distorts the relative prices of a product’s adjacent
container sizes. This result suggests that consumer tastes are not independent, which
supports the hypothesis that new product introduction can explain both puzzles.
Chapter III (joint with Ron Borzekowski and Raphael Thomadsen) continues this
investigation by relaxing the single-firm assumption, thereby allowing competing
firms to sell multiple versions of different products. In particular, we examine how
the presence of additional competitors affects the number of product variants offered
by a firm. The mail order catalog industry proves to be a useful setting in which
to assess the relationship between price discrimination and competition. Because
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mailing lists are pure information goods, they have zero marginal costs. Hence,
any price variation cannot be attributed to cost differences and must therefore be
attributed to price discrimination.
Another advantage of zero marginal costs is that we may focus on the firm’s
decision whether to price discriminate (by offering selects), and if so, the firm’s
choice of the number of options presented to consumers. Examining the decision to
price discriminate provides a direct way to measure whether the prevalence of price
discrimination is higher or lower in competitive markets.
The results indicate that increased competition is generally associated with an
increased propensity to price discriminate. Further, list owners offer menus with more
choices in more competitive markets. That is, not only are lists in more competitive
segments more likely to price discriminate, they will also partition their consumers
into finer subsets.
These results, like those from chapter II, suggest that the relationship between
price discrimination and the presence of close substitutes is largely dictated by con-
sumer preference. This is sensible given that the major difference between the mo-
nopolist and competitive regimes is control; the supermarkets in chapter II are able
to choose which horizontally differentiated products to stock as well as how to price
these products, while the list owners in chapter III must set their prices conditional
on their competitors’ product offerings and price schedules. This distinction implies
that only the magnitudes of the effects should differ.
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CHAPTER II
To Discriminate or Differentiate? Evidence From a
Supermarket Chain
2.1 Introduction
Retailers with market power can extract consumer surplus by introducing new
products (horizontal differentiation) or by offering existing products in different sizes
(price discrimination). Both strategies have their advantages; spatial Hotelling mod-
els suggest that a retailer can increase its profits by adding new horizontally differ-
entiated products and then raising the price on all of its products. Models of second-
degree price discrimination also suggest that retailers can raise profits by offering a
menu of price\size alternatives and allowing customers to select the alternative that
most suits them.
While both horizontal differentiation and price discrimination are individually
profitable strategies, little work has been done to determine how these strategies
interact. I extend a model of second-degree price discrimination to show that when
consumer tastes for horizontal differentiation and price discrimination are indepen-
dent, the introduction of a horizontally differentiated product causes the prices and
profits on an existing related product to fall, but does not distort the relative price
of adjacent menu alternatives. These results suggest that retailers need not sacrifice
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their ability to price discriminate on an existing product when they introduce a new
product.
Using detailed, store-level data from the Dominick’s Fine Foods supermarket
chain, I then investigate whether stores within this chain trade the return from
offering an existing sports drink in different container sizes (price discrimination)
for the return from introducing new products (horizontal differentiation). Sports
drinks are an ideal choice for studying this trade-off; unlike other products sold in
Dominick’s stores, sports drinks are almost completely characterized by their size,
manufacturer, and flavor, all of which are observed in the data. Moreover, since the
number of sports drinks sold by Dominick’s stores increases over the course of the
sample, the data contain a number of opportunities to examine the effect of product
entry and exit.
My investigation into the relationship between differentiation and discrimination
is complicated by the fact that stores choose which sports drinks to stock as well
as how to price these products. These choices are contingent on a number of store-
specific factors not observed in the data, including competition between neighboring
grocers, the vertical relationship between stores and sports drink distributors, and
whether a store chooses to prominently display a sports drink product.
I use the delay in a store’s receipt (removal) of a product as part of a differences-
in-differences strategy to distinguish the effect of new product entry from the effects
of these unobserved factors. Provided that the order in which stores receive (remove)
products is uncorrelated with unobserved factors affecting a store’s pricing policy,
differences-in-differences allows me to identify the causal effect of product entry (exit)
on an existing product’s price schedule.
The above strategy assumes that conditional on observables, all existing products
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will be affected by another product’s entry or exit in a similar fashion. Theory
suggests, however, that the degree to which products substitute for one another
plays an important role in this process. Products that are not close substitutes
for a new product should experience little distortion in their price schedules and
menu offerings when a new product enters, while products that are close substitutes
should experience substantial distortions. As a result, the differences-in-differences
strategy should understate the causal effect of product entry. I remedy this by first
using Bayesian methods to estimate consumer preferences for sport drink SKUs, and
then employ these estimates to capture a product’s sensitivity to another product’s
introduction (removal).
I find that a product release hampers the monopolist’s ability to price discriminate
by distorting the relative prices of a product’s adjacent container sizes. In particular,
a product release typically causes the price gap to drop by 6%. A product retirement,
however, has no effect on the price gap.
Few empirical researchers have examined how multi-product retailers with market
power exchange price-discrimination for horizontal differentiation. Draganska and
Jain (2006) use a structural model to analyze whether consumers value horizontally
differentiated yogurt flavors more than vertically differentiated yogurt product lines.
Having established that consumers value line attributes more than flavor attributes,
Draganska and Jain go on to determine whether manufacturers use product lines to
price discriminate. While this analysis represents the first step in examining how
yogurt manufacturers might trade flavors for products, Draganska and Jain do not
explicitly examine this exchange.
A number of empirical studies have also examined a related problem, the rela-
tionship between competition and price discrimination. Busse and Rysman (2005)
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find that competition increases the curvature in the price schedule of yellow pages
advertisements, while Seim and Viard (2004) find that increased competition leads
to a proliferation of wireless calling plans. Likewise, Borzekowski et al. (2006) find
that increased competition amongst direct mailers is associated with an increased
propensity to price discriminate.
The main difference between these studies and the one that I propose is that Do-
minick’s supermarkets are able to choose which horizontally differentiated products
to stock as well as how to price these products, while firms in these studies choose
their prices conditional on their competitors’ product offerings and price schedules.
This distinction implies that Dominick’s supermarkets can better manage the trade-
off between differentiation and discrimination than firms facing competition.
2.2 A Model of Price Discrimination
I use a variant of the second-degree price discrimination problem proposed by
Itoh (1983) to explore the relationship between horizontal differentiation and price
discrimination. Itoh’s model describes a single-product monopolist who engages in
nonlinear pricing by offering it’s product in a number of quality levels at different
prices to consumers with heterogeneous tastes for the monopolist’s product. Itoh’s
model distinguishes itself from the canonical model of second degree price discrimi-
nation in that the monopolist is restricted to offering its customers a fixed number
of quality levels1 Nevertheless, Itoh’s model yields similar conclusions as Mussa and
Rosen (1978); even if a monopolist only knows the distribution of consumer tastes,
it can induce consumers to reveal their tastes by appropriately choosing the prices
of its different quality levels. Limits on the number of quality levels allows Itoh to
1Although not explicitly incorporated into the model, Itoh points out that this restriction could be due to fixed
costs, like shelving constraints.
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explore how the addition or subtraction of quality levels affects the price schedule.
While Itoh’s model explicitly deals with only one product, in fact two products
are present; the good produced by the monopolist and the “outside good” whose
value must be accounted for by the monopolist to ensure that consumers are willing
to purchase the monopolist’s product. The outside good plays the part of the next
best alternative to the monopolist’s product, and can be thought of as the value of
a horizontally differentiated product.
Unfortunately, Itoh assumes that all customer’s value the outside option identi-
cally, making it impossible to examine the relationship between differentiation and
discrimination. Below, I present a modified version of Itoh’s model with this as-
sumption relaxed. Rather than assuming that consumers only vary vertically in
their tastes for quality, I assume that consumers also vary horizontally in their taste
for the monopolist’s product. By relaxing this assumption, I can examine how a
monopolist’s pricing strategy is affected by the decision to introduce new quality
levels as well as new products.
This model can be readily seen as a version of Rochet and Stole (2002), where the
number and quality of the menu options offered by the monopolist is discrete and
the monopolist sells multiple products. One other difference between this model and
Rochet and Stole’s is that the monopolist is prohibited from choosing a product’s
quality levels. Instead, the monopolist is allowed to choose the price of the different
menu alternatives as well as which alternatives it sells.
2.2.1 Consumers
Consider a monopolist who initially offers its customers a single product in M
quality levels. Denote the sequence of price\quality pairs for product the monopo-
list’s product as A = {(pm, qm)}Mm=1, with qM < qM−1 < . . . < q1. Each customer
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faces the option of either purchasing one of the M versions in A or not purchasing
the product. The utility of the ith consumer is described by
Uim =
 θqm − pm if i purchases m ∈ A ;τx otherwise. (1)
Equation 1 indicates that Consumer i’s utility is completely characterized by the
random variables (θ, x), with θ ∈ [θ, θ̄] and x ∈ [0, x̄], x̄ ≤ 1. While ∂U
∂q
> 0 implies
that all consumers value higher quality, consumers with a higher θ value quality
more than those with a lower θ. Likewise, consumers with a lower x value product
j relatively more than those with a high value. x corresponds to a linear city model
with consumers distributed along the [0, x̄] line segment and the monopolist’s product
located at 0. τ is often interpreted as the “transportation cost” that a consumer must
accrue to purchase the monopolist’s product. Throughout, I assume that θ and x
are independently and uniformly distributed, with cumulative distribution functions
F (θ) = θ
θ̄−θ and G(x) =
x
x̄
, and densities f(θ) = 1




For a given value of x, a consumer will choose (qm, pm) if and only if
θqm − pm ≥ τx, ∀m ≤ M
θqm − pm ≥ θqn − pn, n 6= m
The first inequality, known as the individual rationality constraint, ensures that
the consumer is willing to purchase at least one of the alternatives offered by the
monopolist. The second inequality, known as the incentive compatibility constraint,
ensures that the consumer never wishes to choose any other alternative but the one
designed for him. Because consumer preferences satisfy the single crossing property
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(Uqθ > 0) and utility is increasing in type (Uθ > 0), the above constraints become
θqM − pM ≥ τx
θqm − pm ≥ θqm+1 − pm+1, ∀m < M
In other words, the monopolist needs only choose menu prices so as to prevent
consumers from purchasing the next lowest quality level.
It is important to note that x only appears in the individual rationality constraint.
This occurs because there is no interaction between θ and x in equation 1. The
absence of any interaction mirrors the independence assumption made earlier; people
who enjoy the monopolist’s product more intensely do not also value higher quality
versions of that product more intensely. This assumption implies that the presence
of close substitutes will not affect the price markup of the add-ons.
To derive the demand for the mth quality level, let θm denote the customer type
that is indifferent between purchasing the mth and m + 1st quality levels. Then the














2.2.2 The Single-Product Monopolist





















(pM − CM)(θ̄ − θM(x)) +
M−1∑
m=1
(∆pm −∆Cm)(θ̄ − θm)
]
where Cm is the cost associated with producing quality level qm, ∆Cm = Cm −
Cm+1 and p = (pM , {∆pm}M−1m=1 ). The second line suggests an alternate way to view
price discrimination. Rather than offering its consumers a sequence of alternatives
from which to choose, the monopolist can equivalently offer a low quality base prod-
uct along with a sequence of higher quality “add-ons”. The low quality base product
is purchased by all the monopolist’s customers, while each higher quality add-on is
only purchased by customers with progressively higher θs.
Because the quality levels are chosen by the manufacturer, the monopolist only












































x̃ represents the final horizontal type willing to purchase some version of the
monopolist’s product. Equation 2 indicates that the monopolist may find it optimal
to serve only a subset of the horizontal market. Moreover, equation 2 suggests that
when the entire horizontal market is not served, the marginal type will be determined
by the price of the lowest quality alternative.
Differentiating with respect to p yields
x̃
[
θ̄ − 2pM + τ x̃
2qM
]




























if x̃ = θ̄qM−pM
τ
;
0 if x̃ = x̄.
These conditions identify a maximum since the profit function is quasi-concave in
p.
Equation 3 indicates that when the entire horizontal market is served, ∂x̃
∂pM
= 0
and the price of the lowest quality alternative (pM) is independent of the prices of
higher quality alternatives. However, if only a subset of the horizontal market is
served, equation 3 implies that any changes in the price gap between adjacent higher
quality alternatives will also alter the price of the lowest quality alternative.
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One important feature of equation 4 is that ∆pm is not a function of either pM or x̄.
Their absence implies that the price gap between adjacent menu items is independent
of the extent of the horizontal market served (x̃) and yields the following result
Proposition 1. Serving fewer (more) horizontal types increases (decreases) the price
of all menu items by the same amount
Proof. Suppose that the horizontal market is covered so that x̃ = x̄. Then ∂x̃
∂pM
= 0












= 0, ∀m < M
By definition, pm = pM +
∑M−1
















Proposition 1 indicates that any changes in the extent of the horizontal market
served will only affect the price of the lowest quality alternative. Intuitively, the
monopolist can only serve more of the horizontal market (x) by setting a low price
on the base version of its product and serving lower quality customers in the vertical
market (θ). As the size of the horizontal market shrinks, it becomes easier for the
monopolist to capture more of the horizontal market, allowing it to raise the price
of its base product and serve higher quality customers in the vertical market.
2.2.3 A New Product Arrives
Now, suppose that the monopolist introduces a second product at x̄ and offers
M2 versions of this product. Let x1 and 1 − x2 denote the location of the last
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horizontal consumer served by each product. If no version of this new product is a
close substitute for any version of the existing product, then x1 < x2; there exists
some horizontal consumer type who is unwilling to purchase either of the monopolist’s
products. In this instance, the marginal consumer types x1, x2 will not be a function
of the other product’s price schedule, and the results from section 2.2.2 may be
applied to each product individually.
If, however, the new product is a close substitute for the existing product, then
x1 = x2 = x̃, and the market for each product will be determined by the prices of both
products’ lowest quality version. Nevertheless, the independence between horizontal
and vertical tastes still implies that the price gap between adjacent quality levels of
the first product will be unaffected by the introduction of the second product. These
ideas are formalized in the following propositions (proved in Appendix II.A):
Proposition 2. If a product has the same number and quality of add-ons as a second
product, then introducing (removing) that product does not affect the prices of the
second product’s add-ons.
Proposition 3. Adding products cannibalizes profits from existing products.
Propositions 2 and 3 concretely demonstrate the relationship between horizontal
differentiation and price discrimination. If shelving space is not scarce and markets
not local, Propositions 2 and 3 show that the introduction of new products causes
a parallel shift in an existing product’s demand curve, decreasing profits from that
product but leaving that product’s price schedule undistorted.
2.2.4 Discussion
The purpose of this model is to explore whether a monopolist, when choosing
to sell different brands and sizes of a product, will sacrifice some if its ability to
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price discriminate in favor of new products. The above results suggest that when
the monopolist is free to offer as many different products and sizes as it wishes, then
there is no trade-off between price discrimination and horizontal differentiation.
The absence of any distortion in a product’s price schedule is a direct consequence
of two assumptions 1) the utility function is additively separable in θ and x, and
2) θ and x are independently of one another. Together, these assumptions imply
that consumers who enjoy product 1 more than product 2 do not necessarily enjoy
a smaller container of product 1. This is a reasonable assumption to make when
examining products like sports drinks, and one that I will test in section 2.6.
2.3 Data
I test the above predictions using data on stores in the Dominick’s supermarket
chain obtained from the University of Chicago’s Kilts’ Marketing Center to test some
of the above predictions. Kilts maintains a database containing weekly sales, retail
price, wholesale price, and display information for many of the SKUs sold at each
of the 93 supermarkets in the Dominick’s Fine Foods chain over a 7 year period
beginning in 1989. SKU stands for Stock Keeping Unit, or the level at which a unit
of sale is identified in the data. Here, an SKU is identified by its manufacturer,
flavor and size. Also, a product is defined as the collection of SKUs with the same
manufacturer and flavor.
The Kilt’s data also houses a database of store-level characteristics, including data
from the Census blocks surrounding each store, as well as information about each
stores’ weekly revenue and attendance.
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2.3.1 Sports Drinks
These data cover an important period in the sports drink market. Over the course
of the sample, Gatorade’s twenty-year monopoly faced two major challenges, first by
Coca-Cola’s Powerade product line in 1992, followed a year later by Pepsi’s All-
Sport line. Table 2.1 displays the total sales and U.S market shares of each firm
from 1988-1997. This table demonstrates that the sports drink market underwent a
major expansion over the course of the sample; total sales doubled from 1988-1994.
Moreover, despite its best efforts, Gatorade was unable to prevent either All-Sport
or Powerade from eroding its position; Gatorade’s market share fell from 82.4%, the
year that All-Sport first entered to 73.1% by 1997.
Figure 2.1 demonstrates that competition amongst these manufacturers unfolded
somewhat differently across Dominick’s stores. Unlike the national market, where
Powerade was the first to compete against Gatorade, All-Sport was the first to com-
pete against Gatorade in Dominick’s stores, entering the market in the 183rd week of
the sample. Powerade’s entry was postponed until the 242nd week, more than a year
after All-Sport’s entry. Apparently, entering earlier was advantageous to All-Sport;
unlike the national market where their share lagged Powerade’s, All-Sport market
share dominated Powerade’s for most of the sample. Figure 2.1 also indicates that
Dominick’s stores differ from the national market in one important way; although
Gatorade is clearly affected by both All-Sport and Gatorade’s presence, the figure
indicates that by the end of the sample, Gatorade had regained virtually the entire
market.
Table 2.2 lists the 68 sport drink SKUs that are present over the course of the
sample2 by manufacturer, flavor, size, and its first and last appearance in the sample.
2I omit 6 SKUs from the sample; 5 of these SKUs have no identifiable flavor information and the 6th is omitted
because it is the sole SKU sold in powder form.
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Notice how Gatorade’s products dominate the data; Gatorade’s has 46 SKUs in the
sample, almost 3 times All-Sport’s and 4 times Powerade’s. Gatorade also has more
flavors than either Gatorade or All-Sport (14, compared to 6 and 7) as well as more
sizes per flavor (a median of 4 compared to 3.5 and 2). Gatorade is also responsible
for virtually all of the new flavors present in Dominick’s stores; 6 of the 9 new flavors
that entered Dominick’s were produced by Gatorade (All-Sport had one new flavor,
Powerade had two new flavors).
2.3.2 How Products Are Priced, Introduced, and Removed
Dominick’s corporate office typically chooses which products its stores carry and
which prices they charge. Chintagunta, Dub, and Singh (2003) describe how Do-
minick’s uses zone pricing as a form of third-degree price discrimination. According
to Chintagunta et al., Dominick’s pricing zone policy evolved over time, growing
from 3 zones in 1990 to 16 pricing zones by 1992. These authors also describe how
stores within a zone rarely sell a product for the same price, as well as how prices
are less dispersed within a zone than across zones.
Chintagunta et al.’s finding that that Dominick’s engages in a form of third de-
gree price discrimination suggests that Dominick’s stores possess some degree of
market power. The chain’s ability to price discriminate is supported by Hoch, Kim,
Montgomery, and Rossi (1995), who find that that while store-level category 3 price
elasticities are sensitive to the proximity of competitors, competitive effects are rel-
atively unimportant when compared to measures of store market power.
In addition to setting prices, Dominick’s corporate office also decides which prod-
ucts individual stores will carry. The corporate office maintains a team of corporate
buyers who maintain a particular product category. When a new product is released,
3categories are collections of products. Examples include cookies, juice, sodas, soups, and cigarettes. Sports
drinks are listed in both the bottled juice and carbonated sodas categories.
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“roll-out” teams go from store to store to install a new product in its category. These
buyers also determine when to remove a product from their shelves.
Store managers also play a role in this process. They pass on consumer requests
for a particular product to the corporate office, and if corporate decides to no longer
carry a particular product, can negotiate directly with a product’s manufacturer to
obtain a product.4
The roll-out process generates a good deal of turnover. Over the course of the
sample, I observe 8,421 distinct SKU additions and subtractions across all Dominick’s
stores. Entry and exit is split roughly equally across stores with 4,066 new SKUs
introduced and 4,355 existing SKUs removed. Every SKU either enters or exits at
least one store over the course the sample.
Figure 2.7 succinctly displays how sports drink inventories differ across stores
within the Dominick’s chain. I construct figure 2.3a by first calculating the fraction
of all SKUs that each store sells in a particular week, and then plotting that fraction
for stores at the 75th (dashed), 50th (solid), and 25th (dashed) percentiles. The
leftmost horizontal line marks All-Sport’s entry into the chain, while the rightmost
line marks Powerade’s entry. Figure 2.3b is similar to figure 2.3a except that it
displays the fraction of all products sold by each store during a given week.
Taken together, these graphs suggest that prior to All-Sport’s introduction, each
store carried all of Gatorade’s flavors but that virtually no store stocked all the sizes
that each product was offered in. The increase in store shares that occurs before All-
Sport’s entry could either be a result of each store carrying more sizes or Dominick’s
corporate discontinuing some of the sizes. Table 2.2 indicates that during this period,
Dominick’s stopped selling four SKUs but began selling 6 new SKUs, which suggests
4I obtained this institutional detail from an interview with a Dominick’s store manager.
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that stores began carrying more sizes.
After All-Sport’s release, these graphs show that stores began carrying a smaller
fraction of all SKUs as well as a smaller fraction of all products. An explanation
again comes from table 2.2, which reveals that all of All-Sport’s and Powerade’s
flavors at entry duplicated Gatorade’s flavors, and that virtually all of Gatorade’s
products are sold throughout the sample. These observations suggest that stores
chose to conserve scarce shelf-space by not offering duplicate flavors.
2.3.3 Do Supermarkets Price Discriminate?
Having established that stores in the Dominick’s chain horizontally differentiate
by offering sports drink in different brands and flavors, I must now determine whether
or not stores price discriminate by offering the same product in multiple container
sizes. Specifically, I test whether stores use container sizes the same way as the
monopolist in section 2.2 uses quality levels; to screen consumers. If consumers value
conveniently sized packaging, then the smallest container size may be interpreted as
the highest quality good and the largest container size the lowest quality good. This
interpretation is consistent with the observation that smaller containers of sports
drinks typically have a higher price per unit ounce than larger container sizes.
Equation 24 predicts that a price-discriminating monopolist’s price schedule will
be a nonlinear function of container size. To test this prediction, I regress
log (ppomjst) = β0 + β1 log (cpomjst) + β2bundlem
+ δv + αs + γj + φb + ωt + εmjst (5)
where ppomjst and cpomjst are retail and wholesale price per unit ounce, γj is the
coefficient on the product j dummy to which SKU m belongs, and φb, αs, ωt are the
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coefficients on brand, store, and week dummies. δv are the coefficients on a series
of volume dummies that measure the percentage change in price due to the number
of fluid ounces in SKU m, relative to the 128 ounce size. bundlem is an indicator
variable equal to 1 if an SKU is a bundle of other SKUs and is included to distinguish
the 16 ounce 4-pack from the 64 ounce container size.
Equation 5 uses price variation across stores, weeks, and products to estimate δv.
Normally, δv would not identify price discrimination because price variation could
be due to differences in the marginal cost of producing larger sizes, requiring me to
implement a strategy similar to Shepard (1991) or Cohen (2004) in order to identify
price discrimination. Fortunately, the data include a measure of SKU wholesale
prices, making these strategies unnecessary.
Figure 2.3 displays the OLS estimates of δv. The dashed line plots the price
schedule on the typical sports drink before the 16 ounce container size was replaced
with the 20 ounce size, while the solid line depicts the price schedule after the re-
placement5. Both price schedules confirm the theoretical prediction; retail prices
are indeed nonlinear in container size. Whatsmore, the decline in price per ounce
depicted in both schedules supports an important theoretical prediction made by
Maskin and Riley; quantity discounting.
2.4 Estimation Strategies
Having established that stores both differentiate and discriminate, I use a variant
of differences-in-differences (DIFF) to examine how the introduction or removal of a
horizontally differentiated product affects the prices of an existing product’s menu
items. I use Proposition 2 as my null hypothesis; under the assumption that hor-
izontal and vertical tastes are separable and shelving space not scarce, introducing
5All size dummies are statistically significant at the 99% level.
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(removing) a horizontally differentiated product does not distort the relative prices of
adjacent container sizes. I test this proposition using the difference in price between
adjacent container sizes before and after a product is released (removed).
Unfortunately, the DIFF strategy assumes that conditional on an SKU’s observ-
ables, the addition or subtraction of a product always affects existing SKUs in the
same way. For example, suppose that a store selling only the lemon-lime flavor intro-
duces the tropical fruit flavor in week 82 and the grape flavor in week 126. The DIFF
strategy assumes that on average, the introduction of the grape flavor will have a
similar effect on the lemon-lime and tropical fruit flavors as the introduction of the
tropical fruit flavor had on the lemon-lime flavor.
To see why this might prove false, suppose that consumers prefer to not purchase
any sports drink to purchasing the tropical fruit flavor but always prefer grape to both
lemon-lime and tropical fruit. Then the introduction of the tropical fruit flavor does
not change the value of the outside option and should therefore not affect the price
schedule of lemon-lime SKUs. On the other hand, since consumers always prefer
grape to both lemon-lime and tropical fruit, the introduction of the grape flavor
should increase the value of the outside option, changing the price schedule for both
lemon-lime and tropical fruit SKUs. In this instance, the DIFF strategy mistakenly
averages the outcome of the two new flavor introductions together, understating the
effect of a close substitute.
I remedy this problem by structurally estimating an SKU’s demand curve and
conditioning the DIFF strategy on the probability that an entering (retiring) product
affects that SKU. Doing this allows each SKU to respond differently to a product
entry or exit, enabling the DIFF strategy to distinguish products that affect the
value of the outside option from products that do not.
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The estimation strategy described above will only capture the trade-off between
discrimination and differentiation if the following assumptions hold. First, I assume
that stores are embedded in distinct markets. This assumption implies that con-
sumers find it too costly to travel from one supermarket to another searching for
deals on sports drinks. If this assumption fails, then competition amongst subsets
of stores, and not the introduction of new products could affect the tests described
above. For similar reasons, I assume that competition between Dominick’s and other
supermarket chains (like Jewel-Osco) occurs at the chain rather than at the store
level. Later, I will provide evidence supporting these assertions.
2.5 Estimating Differences in Differences
The main objective of my DIFF analysis is to estimate the causal effect of a
product’s introduction (removal) on a supermarket’s ability to price discriminate over
one of its existing (remaining) products, conditional on that supermarket eventually
adopting the new product. Conditioning on adoption ensures that my estimates will
remain unbiased even if my empirical specification does not properly account for why
some supermarkets choose to never adopt (remove) a product.
Why use DIFF? A simple comparison of retail price markups before and after
a product release (removal) should indicate how firms trade off discrimination and
differentiation. Unfortunately, this comparison will only capture the effect of interest
if no other factors are driving the store’s decision to introduce (retire) the product.
If, say, stores add (remove) products because demand for sports drinks increases
(decreases) then the resulting change in the outcome of interest will capture both
the change due to the demand increase (decrease) as well as the effect on price
discrimination.
22
DIFF solves this problem by identifying a control group; in this case, stores that
experience the demand increase but are delayed in receiving the new flavor. For this
group of stores, the change in the outcome is due entirely to the change in demand.
DIFF is constructed by subtracting the change in the outcome due exclusively to the
change in demand from the simple difference described above, thereby isolating the
effect of price discrimination.
Table 2.3 demonstrates how store adoption times vary. There, I identify the first
week that a new product appears in one of Dominick’s stores and then examine the
fraction of eventual adopters who adopt that product for 10 weeks after the product’s
first appearance. This table reveals that virtually every store that eventually adopts
a product does so by the 10th week following the product’s introduction, with 3/4
of all stores adopting a product after the 3rd week.
Table 2.3 also shows that much of the variation in store adoption times is manufacturer-
related. Many of Powerade’s and Gatorade’s products are almost universally adopted
after the 3rd week, while All-Sport’s products take until the 8th week to achieve sim-
ilar penetration. Powerade’s Mountain Blast and Tidal Burst flavors are the excep-
tion to this pattern; both enter stores at markedly slower rates than other Powerade
products.
Exiting products exhibit similar variation. Table 2.4 displays the fraction of re-
tirees who discontinue a product 10 weeks before the final retiree discontinues the
product. The fraction of retirees still selling the product remains relatively constant
until 4 weeks before the final store retires, when it decreases exponentially. This
suggests that like new products, Dominick’s chain sets target dates for the removal
products from certain stores.
The main difference between the entry and exit is that some stores apparently
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choose to discontinue products well before the Dominick’s chain requires them to. For
instance, table 2.4 indicates that 10 weeks before the final retirement, roughly half
of all retirees had already stopped carrying some of All-Sport’s products. For these
retirees, it seems likely that store-specific events and not chain policy lead retirees to
stop selling the product. If these events are correlated with a store’s pricing strategy
then my estimation strategy will not identify the causal effect of entry (exit).
2.5.1 Specification
I implement a version of DIFF using the following specification
























Ds1(t ≤ τr − 4)
Ds1(t = τr + l), for − 4 < l < 4
Ds1(t ≥ τr + 4)
where Ds is an indicator for whether a product has entered (exited) a store, τr is
the week that a product r enters (exits) a store, and 1(A) equals 1 if A is true and
0 otherwise.
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These dummies play an integral role in my analysis. To see how, recall that SKUs
enter and leave the Dominick’s chain throughout the sample, making these different
events difficult to compare. The relative time dummies δ = (δ−4, . . . , δ4) ease this
comparison by normalizing entry (exit) to a common week 0.
Furthermore, absent any other factors that influence price, δ represents the trend
in the price gap between adjacent container sizes in the month surrounding a product
release (retirement). In particular, equation 6 represents a direct test of Proposition
2. This proposition predicts that δ0−δ−1 = 0; ∆ppomst, which captures the difference
in the price per ounce of adjacent container sizes, will not change when products are
introduced (removed). The remaining elements of δ serve as diagnostic tool; they
highlight retail price trends that are not captured by other regression covariates.
Weekly demand shocks, including holidays, sporting events, and weather could
obscure the effect of product entry (exit). I control for these phenomena by first
differencing each SKU from the next largest size sold each week. First differencing
also controls for store, size, product, and manufacturer fixed effects.
2.5.2 Results
To test Proposition 2, I identify the week in which a product first (last) enters
(exits) the Dominick’s chain and then execute regression 6 on stores that adopt
(retire) the product within 8 weeks of that initial (terminal) date. Doing so excludes
stores who are either late adopters (retirees) or never adopt (retire) the product.
The theoretical model developed in section 2.2implicitly assumed that supermar-
kets could stock as many different SKUs as they wished. As figure 2.7 demonstrates,
most supermarkets have limited shelf space that prevents them from offering all
available sport drink SKUs. If shelving space is limited, then in order to introduce a
new product, supermarkets may have to remove an existing SKU. Hence, the SKU
25
removal and not the new product introduction may be driving price changes.
Although the data do not contain information on the amount of shelving space
dedicated to sports drinks, I account for its presence by only including events where
products are introduced (removed), but no SKUs are removed (introduced).
I plot estimates of the relative time dummies (δ) against weeks to release (retire-
ment) in figure 2.4. The solid blue line plots the regression coefficients, while the
dashed brown lines surrounding the blue display the 95% confidence interval. The
gap at week −1 is meant to ease interpretation of the graphs; omitting δ−1 implies
that the remaining time dummies are interpreted relative to week −1, making δ0
the estimate of the causal effect of entry (exit) on retail price. In the same spirit, I
employ the Delta Method to convert the coefficients from changes in the price per
ounce to fraction changes.
Figure 2.4(a) displays the effect of a new product introduction on an existing
product6. Four weeks before a new product enters a store, the price gap between
adjacent container sizes fell rapidly, dropping by more than 38%. Entry continued
this trend, causing a 6% drop in the price gap. The drop in the price gap also
continued in the weeks following the new product introduction.
Somewhat different results hold for product exit. Figure 2.4(b) displays an in-
creasing price gap over the 8 week window. In the weeks preceding a product removal,
the price gap was 20% lower than in the week before the product was removed. Re-
moving a product, however, has no effect on the price gap between adjacent container
sizes. After the product is retired, the price gap continues to increase, yielding a 32%
increase in the price gap a month after a product’s retirement.
6These graphs only display δ. The full regression results are available from the author upon request.
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2.5.3 Verifying the Model
The theoretical model described in section 2.2 contains a number of testable pre-
dictions that may be used to verify the model’s accuracy. First, Lemma 1 suggests
that after controlling for the change in the price of the largest size, the introduction
(removal) of a container size only changes the prices of smaller container sizes by the
same amount, leaving the prices of larger sizes unaffected. To test this prediction, I
regress













, and Mj in-
dexes the product j’s largest container size.
I execute regression 7 four times; the first two regressions examine how the entry
and exit of a container size affects larger container sizes of the same product, while
the final two examine how entry and exit affect smaller container sizes. Lemma 1
predicts that δ0 = 0 in the first two regressions and δ0 6= 0 in the last two regressions.
The regression results are displayed in figures 2.5 and 2.6. Figures 2.5(a) and
2.5(b) support Lemma 1’s prediction. The coefficients are statistically indistinguish-
able from zero, indicating that the introduction (removal) of container sizes has no
effect on the prices of larger container sizes once the price of the largest container
size has been accounted for.
Mixed results hold for smaller container sizes. Figure 2.6(a) indicates that the
introduction of a new container size lowers prices by 10%, but this result is not
statistically significant. Figure 2.6(b) indicates that the removal of a new container
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sizes raises the price of smaller container sizes by 35%.
I am also able to test a second prediction of the theoretical model; whether the
largest container size’s price is affected by the introduction (removal) of SKUs. Equa-
tions 23 and ?? suggests that 1) the introduction (removal) of an SKU will change
the extent that a product covers the horizontal market, and 2) that any changes in
a product’s horizontal coverage will be reflected in the price of the largest container
size. To test these predictions, I regress
retail priceMjst = β0 + β1wholesale priceMjst + β2bundleMj + δv
+ γj + αs + ωt
4∑
l=−4
δltreatlst + εMjst (8)
where Mjst denotes the largest container size of product j sold in store s during
week t. The estimates of δl are displayed in figures 2.7 and 2.8.
Figures 2.7(a) and 2.7(b) examine how the introduction and removal of a container
size affects the price of the same product’s largest container size. Figure 2.7(a) indi-
cates that the introduction of a new container size decreases the price of the largest
container size by 1.8%, while Figure 2.7(b) shows that the removal of a container
size has no statistically significant effect on the price of the largest container.
Figures 2.8(a) and 2.8(b), which examine the effect that a product introduction
(removal) has on the largest container size of another product, tell a similar story.
In both instances, a product introduction (removal) has no significant effect on the
price of the largest container size.
Together, these results suggest that the horizontal markets are locally served.
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2.5.4 Do Supermarkets Compete Using Sports Drinks?
In order to estimate the causal effect of product entry (retirement) on prices, I
must assert that conditional on a store adopting (removing) an SKU, variation in
store adoption (removal) times depends on circumstances that are unrelated to that
store’s characteristics. As I discussed earlier, this assumption can fail for a number
of reasons, many of which are accounted for by first-differencing.
Unfortunately, including first differences does not control for two important sources
of endogeneity; competition between supermarkets in different chains, and the ver-
tical relationship between Dominick’s Corporate and the supermarkets in the Do-
minick’s chain. Dominick’s supermarkets that are located near Jewel-Osco supermar-
kets may face greater competition than supermarkets located farther away, causing
these stores to compete by lowering their prices as well as offering their customers
additional products. Because my data do not include any information on Jewel-Osco
supermarkets, DIFF may mistakenly identify the effect of inter-store competition as
the effect of new product introduction on prices.
One way to test whether inter-store competition causes sports drink prices to
change is to examine whether a store’s revenues change around the time that a sports
drink is released (retired). This test is based on the premise that if supermarkets were
competing with one another, they would not only compete over sports drinks but
over a wide variety of products. If this hypothesis were true, then the introduction or
removal of new sports drinks should be accompanied by changes in the supermarket’s
total revenue. I implement this test by regressing
log (revenuest) = β0 +
4∑
l=−4
δltreatlst + βt + αs + εist (9)
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where revenuest is the total revenue earned by store s during week t, βt and αs
are the coefficients on store and time dummies, and δl are event dummies described
earlier.
I estimate 9 using OLS with robust standard errors clustered at the store level,
and plot the coefficients on the relative time dummies (δ) against weeks to release
(retirement) in figure 2.9. Both plots in figure 2.9 tell a similar story; on average,
the release (retirement) of a new product has no significant effect on store revenue.
This result implies that inter-store competition is not causing supermarkets to simul-
taneously change the prices on sports drink container sizes and introduce (remove)
sports drinks7.
2.5.5 Is The Delay In Product Adoptions and Retirements Exogenous?
In section 2.3, I described how the Dominick’s chain determines which products
individual stores will carry. I also described how the chain groups stores into pricing
zones and sets different product prices across zones. If the Dominick’s chain also
determines the order in which products are introduced and removed from stores,
and that decision is based upon time-varying, store-specific characteristics, then the
order in which stores introduce (remove) products will not be exogenous and the
relative time dummies in equation 6 will not identify the effect of product entry or
retirement.
To test whether the Dominick’s chain determines the order in which store receive
or remove products, I regress
∆modems = βXs + γz + εms (10)
7I also estimate 9 using only bottled sales as a dependent variable. The results are qualitatively similar to those
described above.
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where ∆modems is the deviation from the modal week in which product m enters
(exits) the Dominick’s chain, Xs is a vector of demographic coefficients (including
an intercept) specific to customers who shop at store s, and γz is the coefficient on
zone dummy z.
I estimate 10 using OLS with standard errors that are clustered by store and
report the results in table 2.5. The second column in table 2.5 reveals that with the
exception of a market size measure, none of the store demographics are significantly
associated with the arrival (departure) weeks of a sports drink product. The coef-
ficient on the market size measure suggests that stores embedded in larger markets
also adopt sports drinks later. The third column yields similar results for retired
products.
The results in table 2.5 indicate that the Dominick’s chain zone pricing policies
do affect the order in which stores receive or retire sports drinks. The second column
suggests that stores in zones 10, 12, and 14 typically receive new sports drink products
a week after stores in other zones. The third column suggests a similar story; stores
in zones 11, 12, 14, and 16 typically hold on to products longer, whiles stores in zone
13 tend to be the first to retire a product.
These results indicate that Dominick’s zone pricing strategy is closely tied to
the order in which products are introduced or retired. Although store fixed effects
do capture Dominick’s zone pricing strategy, the fact that the Dominick’s chain
does choose the order in which products enter and leave stores suggests that other,
unobserved factors may play a role in the chain’s decision.
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2.6 Identifying Substitutes
As discussed earlier, the DIFF strategy presented above will understate the effect
of product entry (exit) on existing products if entrants (retirees) affect some products
differently than others. This flaw may be formulated as an omitted variables problem




δl(treatlst × submst) (11)
where X is the set of regressors and submst is a dummy variable equal to 1 if either
SKU m or m + 1 are affected by a product introduction (removal) and 0 otherwise.
Equation 11 is identical to the conditional expectation estimated using equation 6,
except that it uses submst to distinguish SKUs affected by a product’s introduction
(removal) from those unaffected.
Unfortunately, submst is unobserved. Averaging E[∆ppomst|X] over submst yields




δl(treatlst × Pr(submst)) (12)
where X ′ is the set of regressors excluding submst and E[submst|X ′] = Pr(submst).
Equation 12 suggests that the omitted variables problem may be solved by in-
cluding an estimate of Pr(submst) in regression 12. If I assume that consumers only
purchase a single SKU, then Pr(submst) equals the fraction of customers who switch
from an existing SKU m to the new product, or from an exiting product to SKU m.
In other words, the probability that two products are substitutes is nothing more
than the probability that a consumer will switch between those products.
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I estimate these choice probabilities by parameterizing consumer utility and as-
suming the error term in the utility function follows a Gumbel distribution. These
assumptions allow me to estimate the utility parameters using the grouped data ran-
dom coefficient multinomial logit estimator described in Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes
(1995). Numerous studies employ this estimator because of its economy; as Berry
(1994) points out, even simple linear demand system with J products require the
econometrician to estimate J2 parameters. The multinomial logit estimator remedies
this problem by translating the econometrician’s problem into characteristic space
which has a smaller dimension than product space.
This economy comes at a cost. Controlling for endogeneity when using the multi-
nomial logit is difficult. Although Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes’s popular two-step
estimator accounts for certain forms of endogeneity, their algorithm may not con-
verge if the econometrician happens to choose poor starting values. To remedy this,
I estimate demand using Romeo (2007)’s Bayesian adaptation of Berry, Levinsohn,
and Pakes’s two-step estimator. The Bayesian method has one great advantage over
other methods; because it returns the joint distribution of model coefficients in the
sample rather than just the distribution’s moments, it is more robust to the choice
of initial values.
2.6.1 A Discrete Choice Demand Model
Suppose that shopper i visiting store s during week t can choose to consume one
of product j ∈ Jst’s Mj sports drink SKUs sold in store s during week t . The
shopper earns (indirect) utility
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+ ΠDi + Σvi (14)
from purchasing SKU m ∈ Mj,∀j ∈ Jst. Included in the utility function is xm,
a vector of SKU-specific variables that contains information on an SKU’s size, as
well as brand and size-brand interactions. Also included in the utility function is
salemst, a dummy variable equalling 1 if SKU m is on sale. The coefficients on
these variables, γi and βi, are random and are included to capture the horizontal
and vertical taste variation described in section 2.2. The behavior of these random
coefficients is governed by equation 14, which decomposes a consumer’s marginal
utility into three components;
 γ
β
, common to all consumers, Π, a 7× 4 matrix
of coefficients that captures the interaction between a vector of consumer-specific
demographic variables Di with xm and salestm, and Σ, a 7× 7 diagonal matrix that
captures a consumer’s idiosyncratic tastes for xj and salestm. The vector Di consists
of simulated draws from the store-level joint distribution8 of a consumer’s age, race,
education, and number of housemates. The vector vi is simulated using independent
draws from a standard multivariate normal distribution. Di and vi are assumed to
be independent of one another.
The utility function also contains incomeist − pricesmt, which represents a con-
sumer’s total expenditure on all other products, and φf a dummy variable indicating
the SKU’s flavor. α represents the marginal benefit to a typical consumer from con-
suming an extra dollar of the outside option and is predicted to have a negative sign.
8Unfortunately, the Kilt’s marketing center only includes the store-level marginal distribution of these consumer
characteristics. I employ the GMM procedure described in Romeo (2005) to parametrically estimate the store-level
joint distribution.
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Likewise, φf represents the benefit that a typical consumer receives from purchasing
an SKU of a particular flavor.
Berry (1994) advocates including ξmst in the utility specification to capture SKU
characteristics that are unobserved by the econometrician but might be correlated
with either prices, sales or the vector of SKU dummies xm. ξmst can include unob-
served SKU characteristics like sports tops, time dependent characteristics like chain
advertising expenditures, or store dependent characteristics like shelf placement. To
see this more formally, suppose ξmst = ξm + ξs + ξt + ∆ξmst. This specification de-
composes unobserved SKU characteristics into an SKU-specific component (ξm), a
store-specific component (ξs), a week-specific component (ξt)and a store-week-SKU
interaction term ∆ξjst.
While the dummies described above capture ξm, they do not capture demand
shocks embodied in ξt or promotional activities embodied in ∆ξmst. Since demand
shocks are correlated with promotional activities and prices, without additional con-
trols the estimates of γi, βi will be biased.
I employ two different remedies to control this endogeneity problem. First, I
instrument for ξs by including zone-level dummy variables as instruments. These
zone level variables account for store level decisions that are constant over time,
as well as allow for correlation between stores in the same pricing zone. Second, I
instrument for store-week-SKU interaction term ∆ξmst by including a wholesale price
measure.
Finally, the utility model includes εistm, the random component which in a multi-
nomial logit model is iid and follows a Gumbel distribution. This distributional
assumption is useful because when combined with the assumptions that a shopper
chooses the sports drink that maximizes utility, this distribution yields a partially
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closed-form solution for the probability that SKU m is chosen
Smst =
∫
1(Vimst > Vihst,∀h 6= m)dP (e, v,D)
=
∫














h=1 exp(δhst + µihst)
dP (v)dP (D)
where 1(·) is an indicator function and
δmst ≡ γxj + βsalemst + φflavorj − αpricemst + ξmst, (16)





m=1 Smst = 1, the coefficients on all but one of the SKUs are
identified. The traditional solution to this problem is to identify an “outside option”,
or alternative product that wasn’t chosen, and set all the coefficients for this good
equal to zero. Doing so implies that coefficients on the other SKUs are measured
relative to the outside good. Here, I use the difference between the number of
customers who visit a store in a week and the number of sports drink SKUs sold in
that store during that week. Under the assumption that each customer who visits the
store only purchases a single sports drink SKU, this difference measures the number
of consumers who chose not to purchase sports drinks that week.
2.6.2 The Bayesian Method
I use the Bayesian method described in Romeo (2007) to estimate the parameters
in equation 15. The Bayesian Estimator is based on the two-step GMM Estimator
described in Berry et al. (1995). Berry et al.’s estimator solves for the model pa-
rameters that minimize the distance between an SKU’s actual and predicted market
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shares. To accomplish this, Berry et al. choose values for the parameters in equa-
tion 15, and use simulated draws from the distributions of Di and vi to calculate
the choice probabilities in 15. They then employ a contraction mapping to solve
for the δst = {{δm}
Mj
m=1}Jstj=1 that minimizes the difference between the observed and
predicted shares. The second step in Berry et al.’s estimator uses δst and equation








where ξst = {{ξm}
Mj
m=1}Jstj=1, A is any positive semi-definite matrix, and zst is the
vector of instruments described above. Berry et al. repeat the above algorithm using
different parameter values until a local minimum is found.
Romeo’s algorithm differs from the two-step estimator described above in two
ways. First Romeo adopts a Bayesian framework, treating the parameters Ψ =
(γ, α, β, φf , Π, Σ, σξ, ρ) as random variables rather than fixed numbers. Second Romeo
replaces the identifying assumption E[ξ′stzst] = 0 in equation 18 with
ξ′stzst ∼ N(0, σ2ξz′stzst). This assumption allows Romeo to sample from the joint dis-
tribution of Ψ using a hybrid MCMC estimator. Appendix II.B describes Romeo’s
hybrid estimator in detail.
With these draws from the joint distribution of Ψ in hand, I use the means of
the marginal distributions for my analysis. While comparable to the GMM estimates
produced by Berry et al.’s two-step estimator, these means will differ for two reasons.
First, the distribution assumption on ξ′stzst is stronger than the moment assumption
made by Berry et al., and this will lead to inconsistent estimates if incorrect. Sec-
ond, the Bayesian estimator involves the selection of Bayesian priors that reflect the
econometrician’s beliefs about the parameter values prior to beginning the study.
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These priors can influence the shape of Ψ’s distribution, leading to different results.
Nevertheless, the Bayesian method has some advantages over Berry et al.’s esti-
mator. First, while both methods employ the GMM objective function in equation
18, only Berry et al. attempts to find the objective function’s mode. The numerical
procedures for locating the mode can fail, particularly when the objective function
has either many local minima or flat regions. This problem manifests itself as the
“sensitivity to initial conditions” issue, where the initial values used in the numerical
minimization procedures often determine whether the function’s mode is actually
reached. In contrast, the Bayesian method integrates over the distribution of Ψ to
form an estimator. While this estimator may not be informative, it is certainly com-
putationally feasible. Second, the standard errors of particular model artifacts, such
as demand elasticities, are difficult to calculate using Berry et al.. These standard
errors, however, are simple to calculate using the joint distribution of Ψ.
2.6.3 Revisiting Differences-in-Differences
With the utility parameter estimates in hand, I can derive the probability that
consumers switch from an existing SKU to a new product, or the probability that
consumers switch from an exiting product to one of the remaining SKUs. Let Nst
denote the set of SKUs belonging to an entering product. If consumer utility is
approximated by the utility function described in equation 13 then the probability


















dP (v)dP (D). (19)
In other words, the probability that either SKU m or SKU m + 1 is a substitute
for an SKU belonging to a new product n is the probability that consumers prefer
n ∈ Nst to either m or m + 1.
Now, let Lst denote the set of SKUs belonging to a retired product. Then the
probability that a consumer switches to an existing product is
Pr(submst|Exit) =
∫







dP (v)dP (D). (20)
In other words, an existing SKU is a substitute for an exiting product only if it
is preferred to all the remaining SKUs.
Equation 12 can be rewritten as
∆ppomst = β0 + β1∆cpomst + β2bundlem + δv
+ β3P̂ r(submst|Entry) +
4∑
l=−4
δl(treatlst × P̂ r(submst|Entry) + εmst (21)
for SKUs exposed to a new product and
∆ppomst = β0 + β1∆cpomst + β2bundlem + δv
+ β3P̂ r(submst|Exit) +
4∑
l=−4
δl(treatlst × P̂ r(submst|Exit)) + εmst (22)
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for SKUs exposed to a retired product. P̂ r(submst|·) is the estimated probability
described in equations 19 and 20, where the estimates are obtained from the Bayesian
method described in section 2.6.
2.6.4 Results
The Discrete Choice Model
Because utility function described in equation 13 contains brand fixed-effects as
well as brand-volume interactions, I restrict my analysis to those store-week pairs
where multiple sizes of each brand are sold. This restriction leaves 263 store-week
pairs and 6,424 observations for analysis. Estimation results for the coefficients on
brand, size, sales and price, as well as brand- size interactions are reported in table
2.6. Care should be taken in interpreting the standard deviations; the posterior dis-
tributions of the coefficients are not normally distributed, meaning that the standard
t-test cannot be applied.
The first column in table 2.6 reports γ, β and α, the marginal effects of prices,
brands, sizes, and sales that are common to all consumers. The signs of these coef-
ficients are largely as expected; consumer utility increases with the introduction of
new brands and decreases when prices increase. Moreover, the results indicate that
customers favor receiving discounts on sports drinks. The one incongruency is the
sign of the Volume coefficient, which predicts that consumers value larger container
sizes.
Also of interest are the coefficients on the brand-volume interaction terms. These
coefficients indicate that consumers typically prefer smaller sizes of All-Sport and
Powerade to larger ones. More importantly, these results belie the theoretical asser-
tion that the horizontal and vertical dimensions are separable.
The remaining columns present the random coefficients Σ and the demographic in-
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teractions Π. These columns reveal that All-Sport is relatively more popular amongst
non-whites, senior citizens and the college educated, but less popular amongst larger
households and non-whites. Unlike All-Sport, Powerade is relatively unpopular
amongst seniors as well as the college-educated, but popular amongst larger house-
holds and non-whites. These columns also show that discounts on sports drinks
attract larger households and senior citizens, but non-whites and the college edu-
cated.
Differences in Differences
I estimate equations 21 and 22 on the 263 store-week pairs used in the Bayesian
estimation. Since these regressions contain the generated regressor P̂ r(submst|·),
heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors do not consistently estimate the true
standard error. I remedy this problem by bootstrapping the standard errors and
clustering them by SKU and week9.
To better compare the results, I first estimate equations 21 and 22 without the
choice probabilities and display the marginal effects10 in figure 2.10. Figure 2.10(a)
yields qualitatively different results to those from the entire sample; the introduction
of a new product on average raises the price gap between adjacent container sizes.
The magnitude of the result is also markedly different. Figure 2.10(a) indicates that
a product introduction typically caused the price gap to rise by 65%, while the full-
sample results indicate the price gap fell by 6%. A similar pattern holds for product
exit. Figure 2.10(b) indicates that the price gap rose by 62%, while the full-sample
results indicate that the price gap was unaffected by exit.
9The bootstrap resamples 50 observations per cluster.
10According to equation 12, the causal effect is
E[∆ppomst|treat0st = 1] − E[∆ppomst|treat−1st = 1] = δ0Pr(submst).
As such, the OLS estimates and standard errors from equations 21 and 22 must be weighted by the appropriate
selection probabilities. In both cases, I weight the OLS estimates by the median probability.
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With the baseline results established, I estimate equations 21 and 22 and display
the results in figure 2.11. Figure 2.11(a) indicates that once the selection probability
is included, entry causes the price gap to rise by 30%, which is not statistically
distinguishable from the 62% decrease found in the earlier analysis.
The same isn’t true for product exit. Figure 2.11(b) demonstrates that exit causes
the price gap to increases by 26%, which is significantly different from the 65%
increase found using the old specification.
2.7 Conclusion
Do firms with market power sacrifice their ability to price discriminate in favor of
introducing new products? The theoretical model developed in section 2.2 indicates
that a trade-off between discrimination and differentiation only occurs if either con-
sumers who prefer smaller sizes also prefer a particular product characteristic, or if
shelving space is scarce.
Using supermarket-level data on sports drinks, I first establish that stores engage
in horizontal differentiation as well as price discrimination. I then investigate the
effect of product entry and exit on the price schedule of existing products to determine
whether stores exchange some of their ability to price discriminate for the ability to
differentiate. Sports drinks are well-suited for this study because i) their product
characteristics are observed in the data and ii) a number of new sports drinks enter
stores over the course of the sample.
I employ a difference-in-differences strategy to investigate this model. I discover
evidence supporting the notion that firm’s with market power exchange discrimi-
nation for differentiation. This evidence directly refutes the the predictions of the
theoretical model and suggest that consumer tastes for discrimination and differen-
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tiation are related to one another.
My results closely match results from the literature on the relationship between
competition and price discrimination. This is somewhat surprising since multi-
product supermarkets in my study can choose which products to carry as well as
how to price these products, theoretically mitigating the trade-off between horizon-
tal differentiation and price discrimination.
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Table 2.1: U.S Sports Beverage Market, 1988-1997
Year Total Sales All-Sport Gatorade Powerade
(Millions $)
1988 474 Not Aval.
1989 568 Not Aval.
1990 676 Not Aval.
1991 800 Not Aval.
1992 800 Not Aval.
1993 875 2.9% 82.4% 5.9%
1994 1000 7.6% 73.8% 10.5%
1995 1240 9.8% 72.3% 12.1
1996 1390 10.2% 72% 12.9%
1997 1480 9.6% 73.1% 14.3%
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Figure 2.1: Sample Market Shares, 1989-1996




























Table 2.2: Sports Drink SKUs Sold By Dominicks
Manufacturer Flavor Volume Units First Final
Bundled Week Week
Gatorade Fruit Punch 16 4 1 41
Gatorade Fruit Punch 20 1 287 348
Gatorade Fruit Punch 20 4 337 375
Gatorade Fruit Punch 32 1 1 375
Gatorade Fruit Punch 64 1 1 375
Gatorade Lemonade 16 4 1 53
Gatorade Lemonade 46 1 1 240
Gatorade Lemonade 64 1 1 375
Gatorade Lemon-Lime 16 4 1 196
Gatorade Lemon-Lime 20 4 335 375
Gatorade Lemon-Lime 32 1 1 375
Gatorade Lemon-Lime 46 1 1 292
Gatorade Lemon-Lime 64 1 1 375
Gatorade Lemon-Lime 128 1 1 78
Gatorade Lemon-Lime 128 1 39 375
Gatorade Orange 16 4 1 39
Gatorade Orange 32 1 1 375
Gatorade Orange 64 1 1 375
Gatorade Orange 128 1 92 375
Gatorade Citrus Cool 32 1 1 270
Gatorade Citrus Cool 46 1 1 221
Gatorade Citrus Cool 64 1 186 375
Gatorade Lemon Ice 20 4 335 375
Gatorade Lemon Ice 32 1 1 375
Gatorade Lemon Ice 128 1 288 375
Gatorade Tropical Fruit 32 1 82 374
Gatorade Tropical Fruit 46 1 82 225
Gatorade Tropical Fruit 64 1 133 375
Gatorade Tropical Fruit 128 1 294 375
Gatorade Grape 32 1 126 371
Gatorade Grape 64 1 132 375
Gatorade Grape 128 1 290 348
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Manufacturer Flavor Volume Units First Final
Bundled Week Week
Gatorade Iced Tea 32 1 186 312
Gatorade Iced Tea 64 1 184 307
Gatorade Watermelon 32 1 287 375
Gatorade Watermelon 64 1 287 375
Gatorade Raspberry 20 1 287 347
Gatorade Raspberry 20 4 335 375
Gatorade Raspberry 32 1 308 375
Gatorade Raspberry 64 1 336 375
Gatorade Strawberry Kiwi 20 4 335 375
Gatorade Cherry 20 4 344 375
All-Sport Fruit Punch 16 1 290 336
All-Sport Fruit Punch 16 1 183 297
All-Sport Fruit Punch 20 1 317 375
All-Sport Fruit Punch 32 1 183 297
All-Sport Lemon-Lime 16 1 183 297
All-Sport Lemon-Lime 20 1 317 375
All-Sport Lemon-Lime 32 1 183 297
All-Sport Orange 16 1 183 297
All-Sport Orange 16 1 290 315
All-Sport Orange 20 1 309 375
All-Sport Orange 32 1 183 297
All-Sport Grape 20 1 309 375
All-Sport Raspberry 20 1 342 375
All-Sport Raspberry 32 1 343 375
All-Sport Cherry 20 1 342 375
All-Sport Cherry 32 1 343 375
Powerade Fruit Punch 32 1 242 375
Powerade Fruit Punch 64 1 249 300
Powerade Grape 32 1 242 300
Powerade Grape 64 1 250 300
Powerade Lemon-Lime 32 1 242 375
Powerade Lemon-Lime 64 1 249 300
Powerade Orange 32 1 242 357
Powerade Mountain Blast 32 1 310 375
Powerade Tidal Burst 32 1 344 375
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Table 2.5: Sports Drink Rankings Regressions
Weeks from Weeks from
Modal Entry Modal Exit
Log Median Income 0.554 -2.302
(1.01) (7.72)
% of Non-Whites -1.359 -7.248
(1.31) (9.87)
Ability to Shop -1.500 0.386
(1.68) (9.52)
Market Sized 0.352** 0.619
(0.17) (1.23)
% of Singles 3.270 -82.95*
(6.48) (48.6)
% of Retired -19.75 -44.58
(14.4) (92.3)
% of Unemployed 2.745 181.4
(13.4) (112)
% Population over age 60 17.16 -10.49
(16.5) (104)
% Population under age 9 12.54 -209.5
(23.0) (150)
zone 1 -0.0634 -4.991*
(0.42) (2.77)
zone 3 -0.342 -0.955
(0.42) (3.36)
zone 4 -0.586* 3.069
(0.32) (2.20)
zone 5 0.951** 0.289
(0.39) (2.89)
zone 6 -0.202 2.556
(0.50) (3.77)
zone 7 -0.916 -1.995
(0.87) (4.98)
zone 8 -1.120 9.891
(0.87) (6.29)
zone 10 0.909** 4.880
(0.42) (3.51)
zone 11 -0.279 21.34***
(0.60) (4.21)
zone 12 1.287*** 10.12***
(0.33) (2.17)
zone 13 -0.120 -22.72***
(0.75) (5.02)
zone 14 1.032** 15.37***
(0.42) (2.83)
zone 15 0.245 7.242*
(0.81) (3.94)






Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 2.6: Selected Coefficients from the Bayesian Model
Variable γ, β Σ # Tenants Senior Non-White College
Intercept −6.6 0.56 −1.3 −1.6 1 0.42
(0.56) (0.17) (0.5) (0.5) (0.15) (0.29)
Volume 0.076 0.013 – – – –
(0.0075) (0.007)
All-Sport 10 1.4 −0.049 0.85 0.71 1.6
(0.26) (0.24) (0.75) (0.35) (0.39) (0.55)
Powerade 14 1.4 1.7 −3.6 1.9 −1.4
(0.35) (0.29) (0.96) ( 3) (2.8) (0.58)
Volume × All-Sport −0.46 0.19 – – – –
(0.012) (0.017)
Volume × Powerade −0.74 0.2 – – – –
(0.096) (0.015)
discount 0.12 0.73 1.9 3.2 −1.7 −1.4
(0.67) (0.27) (0.5) (0.44) (0.34) (0.18)
price −2.6 – – – – –
(0.64)
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II.A The Multi-Product Monopolist
Suppose that a second product is introduced by the monopolist at x̄ and this new
product is offered in M2 different quality levels.
Also, assume that the two products have the same number of menu alternatives
and that with the exception of the lowest quality level, the quality levels of the new
product are identical to those of the old product. The monopolist’s problem becomes
max
p1,p2




























(∆pn −∆Cn)(θ̄ − θn)
Further, suppose that the horizontal markets for both products overlap11. Then










is both indifferent between consuming the two products and not purchasing either
product. The multi-product monopolist’s problem yields the following conditions12:
11Specifically, I only consider the case where the base quality variants of both products overlap. It is possible,
however, for the base qualities not to overlap, in which case the market is vertically segmented.
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Equation 23 indicates that the base quality level of each product is a function
of its own price, the base price of the other product, and the price of all add-ons.
This is similar to the first order condition from the single-product case (equation
3), where the base price was only a function of its own price and the price of all
its add-ons. Moreover, because of the independence between horizontal and vertical
tastes, equation 24 is identical to equation 4; the price gap between adjacent quality
levels is unaffected by the introduction of new products.
Proof of Proposition 2. This proposition follows immediately from the fact that equa-
tion 24, which determines the equilibrium price for all product add-ons, is indepen-
dent of all other prices.
Proof of Proposition 3. Without loss of generality, suppose that prior to the new
product introduction, x1 = x̄. After the new product is introduced, it must be the
case that x1 = x̃ < x̄. Since x̃ was available to the monopolist before the new product
was introduced, it must be less profitable then setting x1 = x̄.
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I employ the following lemma to empirically test some of the model’s features.
Lemma 1. Introducing (removing) a container size q∗, where qi > q
∗ > q(i+1),
changes the prices of all q > q∗ by dpM and all q < q
∗ by dpM + dpi
Proof. Without loss of generality, only consider the existing product. Equation 23
implies that the introduction of a new size will change PM . Equation 24 also indicates
that the introduction of a new product will only effect ∆pi and ∆p
∗ = p∗ − p(i+1).
Since pm = pM +
∑M−1
i=m ∆pi, ∀m < M , pm will change by dpM if m < i and by
dpM + dpi if m ≥ i. Similar results hold for the removal of a container size.
II.B The Bayesian Method
Suppose that ξ′stzst ∼ N(0, σ2ξz′stzst). Bayes’ Rule yields the joint density of Ψ














where p(Ψ) is the prior density of Ψ that must be specified by the researcher.
Since the joint density described above cannot be sampled from directly, Romeo
forms a hybrid MCMC estimator by dividing Ψ into three blocks, η = (γ, α, β, φf ),
σ−2ξ , and Γ = (Π, Σ) and derives the conditional distributions for the first three
blocks using equation 25
η|r, z, Ψ−η ∼ N(η, Ωη) (26)
σ−2ξ |r, z, Ψ−σξ ∝ G(
JT + φξ
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For the final block Γ, Romeo notes that no well known distribution corresponds to
Γ so instead implements a random walk Metropolis Hastings algorithm. To do this,
he employs a first order Taylor series expansion of δ(Γ) around the current value of
Γ to obtain a proposal distribution for Γ












Romeo recommends using the following algorithm to sample from the joint density
of Ψ.
1. Choose initial values Ψ0 and δ0 for Ψ and δ.
2. Sample η(r) from the multivariate normal density described in equation 26,
conditional on the most recent values of Ψ−η and δ.
3. Sample σ
(r)
ξ using the Gamma density in equation 27, conditional on Ψ−σξ and
δ.
4. Sample Γcand from the multivariate normal proposal distribution described in
equation 28.
5. Use Γcand and Ψ(r) in the contraction mapping to form δcand.
6. Accept Γcand with probability








where Γ(r) is the current value of Γ and p(·) is the joint density from equation
25.
7. Repeat steps 2-7 R times, keeping only the R− b draws. Discarding the first b
draws allows the Markov chain to throw off the influence of the initial values.
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Competition and Price Discrimination in the Market for
Mailing Lists
3.1 Introduction
This paper examines the relationship between competition and price discrimi-
nation in the market for mailing lists. More specifically, we examine whether list
sellers have a higher propensity to segment consumers by offering a menu of choices
(second-degree price discrimination) and/or to offer targeted prices to readily iden-
tifiable groups of consumers (third-degree price discrimination) in more competitive
markets.
While the textbook definition of price discrimination states that price discrimina-
tion occurs when “two units of the same physical good are sold at different prices,”
practitioners have found this definition unsatisfactory Tirole (1988).1 Instead, they
have defined price discrimination as selling similar goods at different prices in order
to extract consumer surplus. In his book, Stigler (1987) states that a firm price
discriminates when the ratio of prices is different from the ratio of marginal costs for
two goods offered by a firm. More recently, Stole (2003) has advanced a broader def-
inition that “price discrimination exists when prices vary across customer segments
1While Tirole offers this definition, he very quickly goes on to discuss its shortcomings.
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[in a way] that cannot be entirely explained by variations in marginal cost.”2 Our
paper uses this definition of price discrimination.
The mail order catalog industry proves to be a useful setting in which to assess the
relationship between price discrimination and competition. Because mailing lists are
pure information goods, they have zero marginal costs. Hence, any price variation
cannot be attributed to cost differences and must therefore be attributed to variations
in demand. Furthermore, we posit that pure information goods are likely to exhibit
price discrimination: Since one of the necessary conditions for price discrimination
- that resale or transfer of the good be limited - is also a necessary condition for
a functioning information market, any seller of information goods already has the
capacity to discriminate Arrow (1962). We discuss how this resale is prevented in
the mailing list industry in Section 3.2.
In the mailing list industry, buyers often have the option of purchasing names
from the complete list or selecting names from a subset of the list, called a “select,”
at a premium for each name. For instance, if a marketer chose to rent only names
of female consumers from a given catalog list we would say that they chose a gender
select, or if they chose to rent only names of consumers who have purchased over
$100 from that same list then we would say that they chose a dollar select. Typical
pricing might have the base list renting for $70 per thousand names, the gender select
for $75 per thousand and dollar select for $100 per thousand names. Marketers
might choose both a gender select and a dollar select, for example ordering the
names of female customers who spent more than $100; in our example, the marketer
would then pay $105 per thousand names for such a list. Given that all of these
products have zero marginal cost for the list owner, the price differences cannot be
2See Stigler (1987), Tirole (1988), Varian (1989), Stole (2003), and Clerides (2004) for more detailed discussions.
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attributed to cost differences. Thus, this pricing strategy amounts to second-degree
price discrimination.
Offering additional selects is similar to expanding the number of products that are
offered. As authors including Moorthy (1984) and Johnson and Myatt (2003) have
noted, there exists a duality between some forms of second-degree price discrimina-
tion and product-line expansion. For example, the decision of how many package
sizes to offer can be viewed as either a product line decision or as a price discrim-
ination decision if the purpose of offering the different sizes is to extract consumer
willingness-to-pay Cohen (2005). However, Draganska and Jain (2006) demonstrate
that not all product-line expansions constitute price discrimination. They find that
in the yogurt industry, only vertically-differentiated product line variation can be
used for price discrimination, while horizontal product-line expansion generally can-
not. Thus, our paper can shed light on how the optimal product line differs with the
level of competition to the extent that product lines are being chosen for the purpose
of price discrimination.
List owners also offer different prices to identifiable groups of list renters. Most no-
tably, fundraising organizations and charitable organizations are offered lower prices,
while marketers selling similar products to those offered by the list owner are charged
higher prices. Both of these actions constitute third-degree price discrimination.
Initially, much of the price discrimination literature focused only on price discrimi-
nation by a monopolist. However, Katz (1984) and Borenstein (1985) present models
that demonstrate that price discrimination can occur in free-entry markets. Shepard
(1991) empirically verifies that price discrimination is consistent with competition
by showing that that variations in the prices of different grades of gasoline can not
be attributed to cost, and thus constitute price discrimination in a fairly competitive
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market. Similarly, Graddy (1995) finds that third-degree price discrimination occurs
even in the very competitive Fulton fish market.
Having established these facts, subsequent research began focusing on the question
of how competition affects incentives to price discriminate. The ensuing theoretical
literature shows that competition can either increase or decrease the incentives to
price discriminate.
One reason why competition can decrease the incentives to price discriminate is
that if competition is intense enough then there is little room for firms to price above
marginal cost.3 Further, if there are fixed costs associated with price discrimination -
as exist in the mailing list industry - then competition can reduce price discrimination
because the number of consumers allocated to each pricing level can become too small
to support the fixed costs. This latter effect is modeled by Seim and Viard (2004).
These two effects both imply that increased competition makes it more difficult for
firms to price discriminate.
However, competition can also lead to increased price discrimination. The first
reason is that competition can trigger a prisoner’s dilemma where each list pays the
sunk costs required for price discrimination, but where all lists would be better off
if no lists price discriminated.4 Such a situation could arise if consumers obtained
similar value from each of the products offered by a given firm.5 In this case, a
firm without much competition has low incentives to pay the fixed costs of offering
more choices to consumers since any new products simply cannibalize existing sales.
However, when there is more competition, firms now have to focus on attracting
3Similarly, Stole (1995), Desai (2001), and Rochet and Stole (2002) show that the quality distortion associated
with price discrimination can diminish as the level of competition increases.
4Such a prisoner’s dilemma is at the heart of models by Corts (1989) and Shaffer and Zhang (1995).
5While the example in this paragraph uses the language of second-degree price discrimination, similar logic applies
for third-degree price discrimination. Instead of offering more menu choices, the firm would target prices for more
groups of customers.
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consumers from competitors rather than focus on cannibalization. Seim and Viard
(2004) demonstrate that this prisoner’s dilemma will persist for second-degree price
discrimination when the costs of offering consumers more choices is not too expensive.
Competition can also increase the dispersion of willingness-to-pay that any partic-
ular firm faces, and thereby increase the incentives to price discriminate. This occurs
when there is heterogeneity in the degree to which consumers care about cross-firm
product differentiation. Imagine that some consumers are quite sensitive to cross-firm
product differentiation, and thus are hesitant to consume from anyone except their
ideal firm, while other consumers are relatively indifferent about which firm they pa-
tronize. Both types of consumers will generally buy from the local monopolist when
there is limited competition, leaving the firm with little incentive to price discrimi-
nate. However, when the level of competition increases, firms then have incentives
to charge high prices to those consumers who have strong preferences for their prod-
uct, but low prices to consumers who are not sensitive to product differentiation and
therefore treat the firms’ goods as undifferentiated commodities. Chen et al. (2001)
use a model where some consumers are loyal and some consumers switch between
firms to demonstrate this effect for the case of targeted discounts (third-degree price
discrimination). Similarly, Dogan et al. (2005) use a model where consumers have
different sensitivities to product differentiation to show that rebating (second-degree
price discrimination) can become profitable with increased competition.
Because theory alone cannot predict whether price discrimination should increase
or decrease with higher competition, we treat the relationship between competition
and price discrimination as an empirical question.
Several empirical papers examine the link between competition and price discrim-
ination. For example, Stavins (2001), Busse and Rysman (2005), and Miravete and
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Röller (2004) all examine how the curvature of price schedules vary with the level
of competition. In all three cases, competition is associated with an increased cur-
vature in the price schedule. While this seems to suggest that there is more price
discrimination in more-competitive markets, deeper consideration reveals that it is
often hard to tell whether increased curvature should be interpreted as more or less
price discrimination. For example, Busse and Rysman’s study of the yellow pages
advertising market reveals that prices of large ads fall by a greater percentage than
those of small ads under increased competition. However, it is unclear whether this
should be viewed as increased quantity discounting (more price discrimination) or a
move towards marginal cost pricing (less price discrimination). Because of this diffi-
culty in interpretation of the results, these papers are careful not to draw conclusions
about whether price discrimination increases with competition.
In a paper that looks at a similar question - the link between competition and
price dispersion - Borenstein and Rose (1994) find that airline routes with greater
competition exhibit a greater level of price dispersion. Similarly, Asplund et al.
(2002) study the newspaper industry and find that newspapers in duopoly markets
offer a discount to a greater fraction of their consumers than newspapers in monopoly
markets. However, Chintagunta (2002) examines the effect of retail competition on
optimal pricing in the analgesics (pain reliever) category and finds that competition
leads to lower prices on Tylenol’s price, while increasing the store-brand’s price. This
implies that competition is reducing the amount of price dispersion in that category.
In contrast to these papers, we use a different empirical strategy. Since the
marginal cost of all products is zero, we can interpret firms’ offering of additional
selects at prices different than the price of the base list as price discrimination. We
therefore focus on the firm’s decision whether to price discriminate (by offering se-
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lects), and if so, the firm’s choice of the number of options presented to consumers.
Examining this decision of whether to price discriminate provides a direct way to
measure whether the prevalence of price discrimination is higher or lower in compet-
itive markets.
We know of only one paper that has taken a similar approach. Seim and Viard
(2004) study the US cellular telecommunications industry and examine how entry
affects the number of pricing tariffs that the firms offer, finding that increased com-
petition leads to a proliferation of calling plans. Our paper differs in a number of
important ways. First, we examine both second and third degree price discrimina-
tion, while Seim and Viard only examine second degree price discrimination. Further,
the type of second degree price discrimination is different in the two papers. Seim
and Viard examine second-degree price discrimination in the form of different tariff
structures: some consumers may pay different prices, but all consumers who make
a call are buying a good of the same quality. In contrast, the second-degree price
discrimination that we examine is discrimination of the form of either quality dis-
crimination or mixed bundling.6 Finally, only a fraction of the firms in our data
engage in each of the different types of price discrimination that we observe. Thus,
we are able to examine how competition influences a firm’s decision whether to price
discriminate at all in addition to how competition affects the number of choices
offered.
The results indicate that increased competition is generally associated with an in-
creased propensity to price discriminate. These results hold for both second-degree
6The similarity to quality discrimination comes from the fact that selects can be viewed as different quality levels:
more selective lists allow direct mailers to better target their advertising and should therefore be more valuable
relative to the base list. For example, a mailer may be willing to pay more for names of more recent buyers or of
buyers who have large purchase amounts, since the prospects may be more likely to respond to the mailer’s offer or
to spend more, conditional on responding. On the other hand, one could also view this as bundling: purchasing a
base list could be viewed as buying a bundled product, at a discount, that includes the male and female buyers from
the list owner’s catalog.
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and third-degree price discrimination. Further, list owners offer menus with more
choices in more competitive markets. That is, not only are lists in more competitive
segments more likely to price discriminate, they will also partition their consumers
into finer subsets. These results, taken together with the many empirical studies
summarized above, suggest that the connection between competition and increased
price discrimination is a result that applies more broadly. We speculate in the con-
clusion why this may be the case.
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. In Section 3.2, we describe
the mailing list industry and the data. We also describe our measures of price
discrimination and competition. The results are discussed in Section 3.3. Section
3.4 summarizes and discusses the broader implications of our findings.
3.2 Mailing Lists
3.2.1 Industry Capsule: The Mailing List Industry
For over eighty years, businesses have been compiling and trading lists of cus-
tomers, forming the core of an ever-expanding direct marketing industry.7 Marketers
purchase these lists in order to contact potential customers by mail with information,
advertisements, special offers, etc. regarding their products and services. In 1996,
the last date for which the authors have been able to find such data, the mailing list
industry had sales of roughly $1.7 billion and over 31 billion names were exchanged
Borzekowski (1999).
Despite the importance of the direct mail industry, relatively little academic re-
search has been conducted on the industry. Bult and Wansbeek (1995) demonstrates
how to optimally target a direct mail campaign. Anderson and Simester (2004) and
Simester et al. (2006) examine dynamic issues in mail-order catalogs, studying how
7See Burnett (1988) for history and details of the list industry.
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current mailings affect future purchase behavior. Finally, Steenburgh et al. (2003)
and Füsun and Ter Hofstede (2006) both discuss statistical issues with direct mail
data.
Before describing how mailing lists price discriminate, we note that list owners are
represented by list managers who handle the sales and marketing of the owner’s list.
In 1997 there were 150 such managers who advised owners of the catalog lists. Most
of these managed a relatively small number of lists - only 25 managed more than
10 lists. List managers generally receive a 10% commission, and work with the list
owners to set prices and decide about the selects to be offered. As a result, we treat
the decision to price discriminate as a profit-maximizing decision by well informed
agents: even small list owners who rent their lists solely for some extra income will
price strategically with the help of the list manager.
Second-degree price discrimination is implemented through the use of ‘selects,’
or subsets of the list. For example, if a mailing list offers a multi-buyer select then
the marketer can choose either to rent names belonging to the base list, or to pay
a premium and rent only names of consumers who made multiple purchases from
the catalog that generated the mailing list. The most common forms of selects that
we study include multi-buyer selects, gender selects, dollar selects, recency selects
and inquirers-only selects.8 Recency selects are based upon the timing of the last
purchase that the rented name made from the underlying catalog, while the inquirers-
only selects provide names of people who have asked for a catalog but never made
a purchase. Because the timing of recency selects vary across the different lists, we
created a tag of ‘Vintage Names Available’ which we applied to all catalogs that
offered names of consumers who had last made a purchase from their catalog more
8Almost all lists offer geographic selects based upon the consumer’s state or zip code. Since this information is
part of the address itself, these selects can be offered with no additional investment by the list owner. Because they
are so widely offered, we do not include these in our analyses.
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than 24 months prior. While the decision to offer vintage names is clearly a type of
recency select, we include the vintage variable to set a uniform standard of quality
degradation across the lists.
List owners that offer dollar selects or recency selects also have to decide how many
choices to offer. For instance, list owners can offer names of consumers who bought
over $75 worth of items from the catalog at a premium from the price for names off
the base list. The same manager could instead choose to offer two different dollar
select options: names of those who bought over $50 worth of items at a low premium,
or names of those who bought over $100 worth of items at a high premium.9 Recency
selects work very similarly: in addition to his or her base list, one list owner may
choose to offer one recency select with names of consumers who made a purchase
from the catalog within the last six months, while another owner may offer three
selects; names of consumers who made a purchases in the last three months, the last
six months or the last 12 months.
List owners can also engage in third-degree price discrimination. The most com-
mon form of third degree price discrimination involves offering a discount to fundrais-
ers or not-for-profits. roughly 45% of catalog lists offer this type of discount. These
fundraiser discounts can be substantial and often involve the additional perk of not
having to pay an additional premium for any requested selects. The other type
of third degree price discrimination we examine is whether the mailing list owners
charge a premium to marketers from businesses that compete directly against the
underlying catalog; approximately 10% of lists have such a surcharge.
When a marketer rents a list from a list owner, the list owner sends the names
directly to a third party printshop/mailing house that processes the mailing. If the
9Of course, one of the cutoffs for the two groups could be the same as the cutoff for the one group.
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mailer wishes to send out a second mailing to the same consumers then they must
pay for the access to the mailing list twice. The use of the third party is one way
to ensure that the mailers are not able to resell the mailing list. Additionally, list
owners include a few fake addresses (“seeds”) among the actual names, so they can
confirm that their lists are being used only once and that mailings only include
authorized materials. Preventing the resale of the access to the lists is what makes
price discrimination possible.
The mailing list industry was not as technologically advanced in 1997 as some
readers might anticipate. While the technology had advanced beyond the stage of
storing data on physical cards, the 1997 technology primarily used magnetic tape
to transfer data between the parties. Data files maintained by the list manager
were often extracts of data used for the catalogs operations. To offer selects, these
extracts needed to include the extra fields on which to separate the data. Thus,
if a firm wanted to offer a gender select then the firm had to invest in extracting
gender data from its main files. To offer very recent names the firm had to invest in
technology to make rapid updating easy and efficient. The main point is that, counter
to our intuition today, choosing to price discriminate did involve significant fixed-cost
investments.10 By 2002 these fixed costs had decreased, although the industry was
still not near the forefront of technology. Note, though, that the marginal cost of
price discriminating is zero once the fixed cost of price discriminating along a certain
dimension has been made. That is, once the database has been adjusted to allow
price discrimination along a given dimension there are no additional costs based on
the number of times that particular field in the database is utilized.
The degree to which marginal costs are truly zero is underscored by the fact
10For lists maintained on paper cards, an owner wishing to discriminate had to keep three sets of names: a master
list with all of the names, a list with all of the names of the men, and a list with all of the names of the women.
Such a division would be required for any select that the mailing list offered.
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that the mailer is charged for any additional costs besides the costs of the names
themselves when purchasing names from a list owner. For example, this includes a
fee for any media, such as magnetic tape, on which the names are delivered.
3.2.2 Data
This paper focuses on catalog-based response lists, which include the names of
people who have either ordered from, or in some cases inquired about, a mail-order
catalog. One reason we choose to study this industry is that this market is a byprod-
uct of the list owner’s primary business, namely selling merchandise through catalogs.
That is, firms are not establishing new mail order catalogs for the purpose of renting
a mailing list. As such, the firms’ entry decisions, and by extension our competi-
tion measures, can be treated as exogenous in the analysis of the decision to price
discriminate.
The data for this project consists of datacards for catalog-based consumer response
list as of June 1997 and May 2002. The sample restrictions imply that the names
on each list are consumers (rather than businesses) who have inquired about or
purchased from a given catalog. The data include every datacard in the database
maintained by Marketing Information Network (mIn), a company that supplies this
directory to market participants looking to rent a list. Mailers, or their marketing
agents, pay for a subscription to the mIn directory service and are then able to search
the database for lists to rent.11
Each datacard includes the catalog name and the quantity of names available (in
discrete categories) along with the price per thousand names. The datacard also lists
the availability, name counts, and prices for all selects.
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 describe the data. In 1997, there were roughly 1,800 datacards
11One other firm, SRDS, offers a similar directory. However, only mIn offered an online database at the time of
the first sample.
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for lists distilled from mail-order catalogs. From this, we excluded international lists,
as well as lists that were no longer adding new names. Also, some firms used multiple
datacards to represent names from the same list. In these cases, we aggregated
all datacards that we judged to be segments of the same base list into a single
observation. This leaves a sample of 1,209 lists in 1997, and 1,405 lists in 2002.
These values however, mask substantial entry and exit: of the original 1,200 lists
available in the first period, roughly 500 exited by 2002. Most lists are relatively
small, containing under 100,000 names, although a few have over 1 million names.
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 also show the fraction of lists offering the different selects in
each year. Gender selects are offered by between just over half to two-thirds of the
lists, depending on the sample year. Dollar selects are offered by about 40% of lists,
while recency selects are offered by about 67% of lists. Multi-buyer selects are much
less common: only about 15% of lists offer a multi-buyer select. The offering of
vintage and inquirers only names both drop from about 43% of lists in 1997 to about
35% of lists in 2002. The lines labeled “Differential Rates” in these tables show the
fraction of lists engaging in third-degree price discrimination. Approximately 45%
of lists offered special reduced rates to fundraisers or not-for-profit organizations,
while a much smaller number charge higher prices to firms that compete in the same
underlying business.
Table 3.3 presents the correlations between the different price discrimination vari-
ables. In general, the correlations tend to be positive, suggesting that lists that price
discriminate tend do so in a number of ways. However, the correlations are generally
low, allowing us to treat each pricing decision as a separate test of the link between
competition and price discrimination.
82
3.2.3 Measures of Competition
Our competition measures are derived from the 47 different categories into which
mIn classifies lists.12 Most of the lists are classified into one or two categories (see
Figure 3.1) and a careful inspection of the data suggests that cases where the lists
are classified in multiple categories are legitimate.
Using this classification, our basic approach to calculating competition measures
is to add the number of lists that are classified in the same categories as the given
list. However, this approach is complicated by the fact that lists often only partial
overlap in their industry classifications. In these cases, we use measures where lists
that partially overlap in their classifications count as providing some competition,
but less than those lists that have exact matches. Note that this is justified not only
in terms of the underlying characteristics of the list, but also in the institutional way
that many of the marketers used to decide which mailing list to purchase: Using the
mIn software, mailers can search by inputting industry codes and then choosing lists
from the results of those queries.
We use three different measures of competition in order to ensure that the exact
way that we calculate our competition measure is not driving our results. All three
measures are based on the same principle: lists that have no overlapping classifica-
tion codes are given a competitor weight of zero, lists that have exactly the same
classification codes are given a weight of one, and lists that partially overlap are given
a weight between zero and one. The competition measure is then the sum of these
12The categories used are Animals/Pets/Wildlife, Apparel, Areas Of Interest, Arts Cultural/Musical, Attendees,
Beauty & Cosmetics, Boats/Boating, Books, Children, Children’s Apparel, Children’s Books/Pubs, Children’s Mer-
chandise, Collectibles, Computers, Diet & Fitness, Electronics, Environment, Fishing, Food/Kitchen Equipment,
Furniture, Games/Contests/Puzzles, Gardening/Horticulture, General Merchandise, Gifts, GunsWeapons, Health,
History, Hobbies Or Crafts, Home Decor/Accessories, Home Improvement, Hunting, Jewelry, Leisure/Recreation,
Lotteries/Gambling, Mens Publications/Books, Motor Vehicles, Music, Photography, Record/Cassette/CD, Sexu-
ally Oriented, Sports, Sports Merchandise, Tools/Equipment, Travel, Video Tapes, Womens Publications/Books,
Woodworking.
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weights. The variation in our three competition measures lies in how they calculate
the weight for partially-overlapping lists.13
Our main competition measure, CompMatch, is constructed by calculating pair-
wise the fraction of codes present for two lists that are common between them, and




Number of codes listed by both i and j
Number of codes listed by i or j
(1)
CompMatch has the advantage of being intuitive, symmetric and utilizing the infor-
mation of non-matching codes from both lists.
We also examine whether we get similar results when we use two other measures




Number of codes listed by both i and j
Number of codes listed by list i
(2)
CompAve is similar to CompMatch, except that the denominator includes only
those codes on the list list for which competition is being calculated. This measure
is a bit awkward because it is asymmetric and because it throws away some infor-
mation about the degree of proximity of lists. However, it is the average number of
competitors that will appear in any query that would include the featured list, so it
has some intuitive appeal.
To calculate the last measure, we first create a vector of ones and zeros to indicate
whether a particular list is classified as being in each industry. CompCos is then
constructed by calculating the cosine of the angle formed between the code vector
and a similar vector for each other list and then summing over all lists. The cosine
between two lists with exactly the same industry codes is one while the cosine for
13These measures are related to distance metrics frequently used in cluster analysis involving binary variables. See
Anderberg (1973) for a discussion of these metrics.
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lists with no overlap is zero, and, because all vectors are non-negative, any partial








Number of codes listed by both i and j√
Number of codes listed by list i ∗ Number of codes listed by list j
(3)
The summary statistics for these competition variables appear in Table 3.1 and
Table 3.2. A histogram of CompMatch appears in Figure 3.2 to give the reader a
broader understanding of the distribution of competition. Table 3.4 then presents
the correlations between these different measures. The correlations between these
measures are high, largely because of the number of lists that are classified in only
one or two industries.
CompMatch and the other competition measures attempt to capture the similarity
between the different lists by accounting for the degree to which the lists are classified
in the same way. However, one shortcoming of these competition measures, and of our
data, is that we have limited ways to control for the degree of heterogeneity among
the lists within a particular code. One consequence of not being able to fully capture
product differentiation is that our measures of competition appear to be high. For
example, while many lists have few competitors, the mean number of competitors
for each list was near 90. In interpreting our main results, our assumption is that
these measures are correlated enough, or even proportional, to the ‘true’ amount of
competition.
However, to control for some of the unobserved heterogeneity, we also conduct
an additional analysis using just lists with over 50,000 names. This is a reasonable
approach to take if these lists form their own ’markets,’ different from the smaller,
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more specialized lists. In these regressions, the primary competition measure is recal-
culated assuming that only the larger lists compete with each other, and restricting
the regression sample to the larger lists as well. The subsample includes about 60%
of the original sample. Here, the mean number of competitors drops to 48. As we
report later, the main results generally become stronger when we do this.14
Finally, all of the results presented in this paper focus on the impact of the
natural log of competition. We focus on the log of competition because, consistent
with many theories of competition, we expect that the impact of each marginal
competitor becomes smaller as the total number of competitors increases. That is,
we expect that the differences between having 10 vs. 20 competitors is substantially
larger than the difference between having 130 vs. 140 competitors. We have also
confirmed that this functional form is reasonable by using other flexible forms, such
as including linear and squared terms, which give similar curvature.
3.2.4 Other Variables
In addition to the competition measure, the estimation controls for the size of each
mailing list. There are two reasons we include the size of the list in the regression.
First, smaller lists may find it harder to recover any fixed costs that are necessary
to engage in price discrimination because their revenues will generally be lower.15
Second, there is an inherent tradeoff when offering selects: While offering a select
can increase the total number of customers that rent the list and increase the price
per name, some direct mailers who choose a select may have chosen to rent the
entire base list if the select were not available. Generally, prices observed in the data
dictate that revenues from selling an entire list are greater than revenues from selling
14We have also conducted the analysis further restricting the sample to only those lists with over 100,000 names
without altering the results.
15These fixed costs are discussed earlier in section 3.2.
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an entire select. Smaller lists will find that the probability of selling their full list
are higher than they are for larger lists, where orders are constrained by the size of
the marketer’s budget or campaign. For both of these reasons, we hypothesize that
price discrimination will increase with list size.
The focus of this study is on the relationship between market structure and the
incentives to price discriminate. To control for the possibility that the decision to
price discriminate depends on the size of demand for a mailing list instead of the the
number of competitors, the empirical specifications include measures of market size.
We do not observe direct quantity data, nor do we know how many mailers may be
interested in a given list. Instead we proxy market size with the average total sales
in the industries with the NAICS codes that best match the mIn categories. These
data are collected from the Economic Census. When mailing lists classify themselves
in multiple industries, we average over all of the mIn categories for which we were
able to match NAICS codes. Because the industry size information is missing for
some observations, the number of observations used in the estimation is reduced from
1,209 (1,405) to 1,094 (1,268) in 1997 (2002).16
3.3 Results
Our findings broadly demonstrate that mailing list owners in more competitive
industries are more likely to price discriminate. We find that this is true for both
second- and third-degree price discrimination. Further, among those mailing lists
that choose to implement second-degree price discrimination, those in more compet-
itive markets tend to offer menus with more options than those in less competitive
markets.
16In prior versions of the paper, we also report results using the number of establishments or employees in the
industry (using the same NAICS match) as alternate specifications. These other measures do not change the results.
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3.3.1 Second-Degree Price Discrimination
We estimate the choice of whether to use each of the different types of price dis-
crimination strategies (selects) as separate probit regressions.17 We also run two
OLS regressions where the dependent variables are the number of dollar selects and
recency selects offered. Table 3.5 presents results from 1997, while Table 3.6 presents
results from 2002. The coefficients on competition are positive across all specifica-
tions and across all years. All of the competition coefficients are also statistically
significant at the 5% level, except for gender select and inquirers only availability.
The positive, statistically significant coefficients on competition demonstrate that
mailing lists in markets with high levels of competition are more likely to exhibit
second-degree price discrimination. The first several columns - those for gender
selects, dollar selects, recency selects and multi-buyer selects - can be interpreted as
examples of offering products of higher quality in order to price discriminate. The
next two columns, those for vintage names and inquirers only, are examples of quality
degradation - deliberately offering a degraded quality product in order to siphon off
the low valuation buyers.
To gauge the approximate magnitude of the effects, the first line of each panel in
Table 3.7 reports the increase in the probability of price discriminating that would
be associated with moving from the 10th percentile of the competition measure to
the 90th percentile, holding the other variables fixed at their respective means. The
largest effect is for dollar selects, where the increase in competition is associated with
a 26% (32%) increase in the probability of price discriminating in 1997 (2002). In
the data, roughly 40% of lists offer this select, indicating that competition seems to
have a substantial effect. Similarly, moving between these two levels of competition
17Estimating a regression where the number of types of price discrimination is the dependent variable or jointly
estimating the probits as a multivariate system both yield similar results.
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is associated with an 16% increase in the probability of offering vintage names,
compared to the 36% of lists that offer the select in 1997. The magnitudes of the
effects for recency and multi-buyer selects are smaller, although the 7.2% change in
probability associated with the multi-buyer select may seem more significant given
that only 16% of all lists offer a multi-buyer select.
List owners offering dollar and recency selects also need to decide how many
different dollar amounts or time horizon cutoffs they should offer. Thus, in addition
to running probit regressions on whether mailing list owners offer these selects, we
also sum the number of dollar selects or recency selects offered among those list
owners who price discriminate and regress these counts on our competition measure.18
The results of these regressions are reported in columns 7 and 8 of Tables 3.5 and
3.6. The coefficients on competition are positive and significant, indicating that
greater competition is correlated with a greater partition of the product space. The
two columns for counts in Table 3.7 show the difference in the expected number of
dollar and recency selects offered at the 10th and 90th percentiles of competition,
evaluating all other variables at their respective means. The change of roughly .35
dollar select counts represents an increase of 12.5% relative to the mean of roughly
2.8 in the sample. The results for recency are quite similar.
The results also show that owners of large mailing lists are more likely to price
discriminate than owners of small mailing lists. To see this note that, except in the
case of inquirers, lists with over 50,000 names on them are always statistically more
likely to price discriminate than those lists with less than 50,000 names. It is also
true that lists with over 100,000 names are more likely to price discriminate than
lists with between 50,000 and 100,000 names, although the statistical significance and
18Similar results are obtained when the observations where these selects are not offered are included in the regres-
sions.
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uniformity of this result is smaller. However, once lists are large enough - perhaps
200,000 names - it appears that additional names no longer factor into the decision
to price discriminate. There is also evidence that larger lists offer menus with more
choices to consumers. These results are consistent with the hypotheses advanced in
Section 3.2.4 - that owners of small lists have a harder time recovering fixed costs of
price discrimination, and that small lists may forgo selling their full list by offering
selects.
3.3.2 Third-degree Price Discrimination
We examine the link between competition and third-degree price discrimination
by considering two types of third-degree price discrimination observed in the data:
fundraiser rates and competitor rates. As was the case for second-degree price dis-
crimination, probit regressions reveal that greater competition is associated with
a greater propensity to price discriminate, although the effect is stronger for the
fundraising channel. The changes in the probability of offering a fundraiser rate
corresponding to the difference between the 90th and 10th percentiles of the compe-
tition measures is 33% (29%) in 1997 (2002). This probability is only 4.2% (6.0%)
for charging competitor rates, although only 9% (13%) of all lists have a competitor
surcharge in 1997 (2002).
We also still find that larger lists are more likely to third degree price discriminate
than smaller lists.
3.3.3 Alternate Specifications
Table 3.7 demonstrates that our results are robust to the precise specification
that we use. As described above, this table reports the descriptive (not causal)
differences in probabilities of price discriminating associated with the 90th percentile
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of competition compared to those associated with the 10th percentile.
As referenced in Section 3.2.3, one potential issue is the degree to which het-
erogeneity within industry codes is left uncaptured by our competition measures.
As one possibility, small lists might be specialty lists that appeal to different direct
mailers than large lists do. To examine this issue, we reran our analysis using only
lists that have more than 50,000 names. The second line in Table 3.7 reports these
results. Generally, both the magnitude and statistical significance of the results are
increased. In 1997, the coefficient on competition in the inquirers-only probit be-
comes significant while the effect of competition in the competitor surcharge probit
becomes insignificant; neither of these changes are observed in 2002, suggesting that
these changes are probably random noise.
In a similar vein, the histograms of our competition measure presented in Figure
3.2 show a spike in competition at the high end of the distribution, which is due
to the presence of many lists in the apparel industry. A skeptical reader might
suspect that our results are mostly driven by the probability that mailing lists in the
apparel industry choose to price discriminate. The third line in Table 3.7 reports
results from a model that includes an indicator variable for whether the list is in the
apparel industry. We find that the results are generally of a similar magnitude and
significance, even controlling for this effect.
The next two lines show that the results are generally robust to the way that
we measure competition. If we construct the competition measures using either
CompAve or CompCos, we see that, in general, the results are similar in magnitude
and significance to the CompMatch results.
Lastly, the final line in Table 3.7 presents the way that our results would change
if we included fixed effects for the different list managers. One might hypothesize
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that the results presented above are the result of the fact that a few large managers
who happen to be in more competitive industries tend to be more likely to price
discriminate. One response would be to note that this would not invalidate the
robustness of our results. It is possible that those lists in very competitive industries
choose to go to large, sophisticated managers in order to compete more effectively.
In spite of this argument, we include indicator variables for each of the managers19
and find that the results are, for the most part, qualitatively similar, underscoring
the strength of our results.
The second panel of Table 3.7 reports the results from the 2002 data. Taken
together, along with the fairly high levels of entry and exit, the two panels of Table 3.7
demonstrate the robustness of our results to the precise specification of the estimated
model.
3.4 Conclusion
Theoretical ambiguity as to whether more-intense competition should lead to more
or less price discrimination leaves the net impact as an empirical question. Mailing
lists provide a good context in which to study this question because mailing lists are
zero-marginal cost goods, meaning that differences in prices must be the result of
demand, not cost. We find that greater competition is associated with more second-
and third-degree price discrimination and that firms that implement second-degree
price discrimination in more-competitive industries offer consumers menus with more
choices.
There are at least two reasons why competition might lead to increased price
discrimination. First, the increased probability of losing customers to competitors
19Because indicator variables for managers who have only one list would perfectly predict whether the client list
price discriminates, we create an indicator variable for small managers, and assign this indicator for all managers
that manage one or two lists.
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may trigger a prisoner’s dilemma where firms pay the sunk costs required for price
discrimination. Second, increased competition can lead firms to price discriminate in
order to extract surplus from those consumers who care a lot about cross-firm product
differentiation while retaining those consumers who view products from different
firms as close substitutes.
While we cannot test which of the theories leads to our conclusion, it is interesting
to note that our results are consistent with this last hypothesis. For example, it is
likely that the marketers who gain the most value from a multi-buyer select are those
marketers who are promoting products that are similar to those offered in the catalog
from which the mailing list was derived. These marketers are also the marketers who
are most sensitive to product differentiation: The value they obtain from purchasing
names from a list derived from a catalog selling very similar products compared to a
list derived from a more distant product is high, while those marketers who are selling
products that are only somewhat related to the underlying product do not care as
strongly which list they purchase and are unlikely to pay for a multi-buyer select. The
argument for dollar selects is the same. The logic would apply to recency and vintage
selects to the extent that people’s purchasing patterns change more quickly than their
underlying interests and that it is possible to target consumers with specific interests
through a broader set of lists than one could use to target purchasing patterns.
For third degree price discrimination, fundraisers probably see the various mailing
lists as relative commodities, while marketers care about the catalog from which
the mailing list was derived; Marketers representing direct competitors are the most
sensitive to product differentiation between lists. In contrast, it is harder to fit this
reasoning on the gender and inquirers only selects - the two selects where our results
are statistically insignificant.
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There are reasons to believe that these results generalize outside of the mailing
list industry. In particular, many observed practices conform to the idea that com-
petition increases price discrimination which segments consumers by their sensitivity
to product differentiation. For example, in the airline industry the gap between un-
restricted and restricted fares increases with competition (Stavins (2001)), consistent
with business consumers who buy unrestricted fares generally having the lowest will-
ingness to take another airline due to their desire for direct flights at their optimal
time and/or from benefits of a rewards program. In the newspaper industry, greater
poaching is observed in more-competitive markets (Asplund et al. (2002)), and the
lower subscription rates offered to consumers in geographic areas better covered by
another paper picks off those consumers who do not care as much about the locality
of their paper. Finally, it is possible that the merchants who buy large yellow page
advertisements in the market studied by Busse and Rysman (2005) are the ones most
likely to reallocate their advertising strategy (or size) when competitors offer them
more outlets in which to advertise. Our results, taken together with these other em-
pirical studies, suggest that the connection between competition and increased price
discrimination is a result that applies broadly.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics 1997
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
List Size
0-49,999 Names 1209 0.40 0.49 0 1
50,000-99,999 Names 1209 0.23 0.42 0 1
100,000-199,999 Names 1209 0.15 0.36 0 1
200,000-299,999 Names 1209 0.07 0.25 0 1
300,000-399,999 Names 1209 0.04 0.19 0 1
400,000-499,999 Names 1209 0.03 0.17 0 1
500,000-999,999 Names 1209 0.05 0.21 0 1
1,000,000+ Names 1209 0.04 0.20 0 1
Selects Available
Gender Select Available 1209 0.55 0.50 0 1
Dollar Select Available 1209 0.38 0.49 0 1
Recency Select Available 1209 0.68 0.47 0 1
Multi-Buyers Available 1209 0.15 0.36 0 1
Vintage Names Available 1209 0.43 0.49 0 1
Inquirers Available 1209 0.43 0.49 0 1
Select Counts
Dollar Select Count 461 2.83 1.19 1 7
Recency Select Count 824 2.35 1.11 1 7
Differential Rates
Fundraiser Rate Available 1209 0.43 0.50 0 1
Competitor Rate Available 1209 0.09 0.29 0 1
CompMatch 1209 74.80 44.86 2.21 167.79
CompAve 1209 120.12 71.83 4 281
CompCos 1209 108.49 64.25 3.12 257.10
Control Variables
Apparel Indicator 1209 0.23 0.42 0 1
Mkt Size: Dollar ($bil) 1094 63.26 88.80 2.25 560.30
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics 2002
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
List Size
0-49,999 Names 1405 0.37 0.48 0 1
50,000-99,999 Names 1405 0.20 0.40 0 1
100,000-199,999 Names 1405 0.17 0.37 0 1
200,000-299,999 Names 1405 0.08 0.27 0 1
300,000-399,999 Names 1405 0.04 0.20 0 1
400,000-499,999 Names 1405 0.03 0.16 0 1
500,000-999,999 Names 1405 0.05 0.22 0 1
1,000,000+ Names 1405 0.05 0.23 0 1
Selects Available
Gender Select Available 1405 0.67 0.47 0 1
Dollar Select Available 1405 0.40 0.49 0 1
Recency Select Available 1405 0.66 0.47 0 1
Multi-Buyers Available 1405 0.16 0.37 0 1
Vintage Names Available 1405 0.36 0.48 0 1
Inquirers Available 1405 0.35 0.48 0 1
Select Counts
Dollar Select Count 566 2.89 1.18 1 8
Recency Select Count 933 2.41 1.20 1 12
Differential Rates
Fundraiser Rate Available 1405 0.47 0.50 0 1
Competitor Rate Available 1405 0.13 0.34 0 1
CompMatch 1405 90.26 50.55 1.38 191.01
CompAve 1405 155.34 86.07 4 358
CompCos 1405 138.85 77.69 2.01 340.24
Control Variables
Apparel Indicator 1405 0.26 0.44 0 1

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.4: Correlation Among Competition Measures
1997
CompMatch CompAve CompCos
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This thesis demonstrates that two seemingly disparate questions, why different
retailers offer different versions of a product, and how competition distorts the price
schedule of a multi-version product, are in fact related to one another.
Chapter II developed a theoretical model suggesting that a trade-off between new
products and different sizes of existing products only occurs if either consumers who
prefer smaller sizes also prefer a particular product characteristic, or if shelving space
is scarce.
Using data on a large supermarket chain, I employed a difference-in-differences
strategy to investigate this model. I found that the introduction of new products
typically causes the price gap to drop by 6%, This evidence supports the notion that
firms with market power exchange discrimination for differentiation.
Chapter III examined issues similar to those in chapter II but in a multi-firm
setting. This difference lead my co-authors and I to examine the market for mailing
lists, where numerous list owners selling similar lists engage in both 2nd and 3rd
degree price discrimination. One of the great advantages of this market is that the
marginal cost of selling an additional select is zero, enabling us to distinguish price
discrimination from differences in list costs, as well as to focus on the decision to price
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discriminate rather than a product’s price schedule. We find that greater competition
is associated with more second- and third-degree price discrimination and that firms
that implement second-degree price discrimination in more-competitive industries
offer consumers menus with more choices.
The results from these chapters appear to contradict one another. Chapter II in-
dicates that the introduction of a close substitute will adversely affect a firm’s ability
to price discriminate. Chapter III, however, suggests the opposite; the introduction
of a close substitute actually promotes price discrimination.
One explanation for this discrepancy is theoretical. In the competitive case, com-
petition can trigger a prisoner’s dilemma where each list pays the sunk costs required
for price discrimination, but where all lists would be better off if no lists price dis-
criminated Such a situation could arise if consumers obtained similar value from
each of the products offered by a given firm. In this case, a firm without much
competition has low incentives to pay the fixed costs of offering more choices to
consumers since any new products simply cannibalize existing sales. However, when
there is more competition, firms now have to focus on attracting consumers from
competitors rather than focus on cannibalization.
A second explanation is data-related. Roughly speaking, the competitive measures
employed in chapter III group mailing lists by industry. If these industry codes are
too broad, then lists that are not close substitutes will be grouped together. If it
is also the case that these lists do not have close substitutes, then we may obtain
chapter III’s result. This problem is less likely to be true for chapter II, as this
chapter attempts to control for the presence of close substitutes using estimates
from a discrete choice demand model.
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